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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Reproduction in the Welfare State: 
Public Spending for Family Planning and Abortion Services in the United States 
 
By 
 
Mikaela H. Smith 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Associate Professor Catherine Bolzendahl, Chair 
 
 
 
This project uses state-level data to answer a variety of questions related to the provision 
of vital healthcare services as a right of citizenship in a wealthy democracy. I focus on spending 
for reproductive healthcare policy specifically, which also allows me to explore the tension 
between state policy as granting women rights to bodily autonomy and state policy as a tool for 
instilling racialized and gendered norms onto women’s bodies and behaviors. As such, this work 
as falling at the intersection of politics, health, and inequality and builds on a robust body of 
literature exploring variation in social protections in industrialized democracies. 
In my first empirical chapter, I employ theories of welfare state development to the 
exploration of variation in Medicaid spending across the United States from 2006-2016. Through 
several time-series panel regression models, I find general support for functionalist arguments of 
welfare state development, though these findings are somewhat tempered by the race of those in 
need. My second chapter focuses on Medicaid spending for family planning services, specifically 
those related to contraception and sterilization. In this chapter I use OLS regression to compare 
state variation in spending, as derived from the Guttmacher Institute’s comprehensive survey of 
reproductive healthcare professionals, at three recent time points. Paying particular attention to 
xiv  
 
the relationship between need for publicly supported contraceptives and spending generosity 
reveals that states with higher levels of need among White women tend to offer more generous 
spending, while those with higher need among Black women present the opposite. Similarly, my 
third chapter compares state policy on public spending for abortion services using two methods: 
traditional OLS regression and mixed-methods approach called qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA). 
Taken together, these three chapters support notions of a racialized and gendered welfare 
state in which state policy differentially mediates access to rights of citizenship. In doing so, this 
project offers three main contributions to the sociological literature. First, it expands upon the 
welfare state literature by applying traditional theories to a different form of welfare, 
reproductive healthcare. Second, it contributes to methodological debates surrounding best 
practices for small-N studies of comparative welfare states through its use of both regression and 
QCA. Third, it maintains the importance of applying an intersectional lens to studies of welfare 
state spending based on results that suggest differential policy responses depending on the race 
of those in need as well as via its focus on an inherently gendered form of spending, that for 
reproductive healthcare. 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a complicated history with provision of social services. Early 
social spending came in the form of pensions for Civil War veterans, along with support for 
“American women as mothers or potential mothers” (Skocpol 1992). In this way, while many 
scholars tout its position as a welfare state “laggard” (e.g. De Swaan [1988]), the U.S. was 
indeed an early adopter of social spending policies. Yet these social safety nets often failed to 
provide equal protection across demographics, and often came with strings attached (Gordon 
1994; Hacker 2002; Quadagno 1996).  
In their observation of the Job Corps program of Johnson’s War on Poverty, Quadagno 
and Fobes find “that the welfare state reproduces gender stratification structurally by replicating 
a gendered division of labor and culturally by inculcating an ideological framework that sustains 
that division of labor” (Quadagno and Fobes 1995). Similarly, we can observe how racial 
inequalities were perpetuated based on eligibility for this type of welfare support. The question 
of the role of the state in perpetuating or alleviating inequality is not new, nor uncommon within 
the sociological literature. This project simply applies this over-arching question to a single case: 
reproductive healthcare in the United States. 
Not unlike other types of welfare state provisions, funding and support for reproductive 
healthcare services in the U.S. is extremely limited when compared to those in other 
democratized, industrialized nations. Women from the U.S. report lower satisfaction with their 
healthcare services while paying higher out-of-pocket costs (Gunja et al. 2018). Rates of 
  2 
maternal mortality are disproportionally high, particularly for women of color (Center for 
Reproductive Rights 2011). The level of gender and race inequality persistent within U.S. 
reproductive policy and practice has suggested that the U.S. is in violation of U.N. Human 
Rights protocols. And yet recent policies continue to limit women’s access to contraceptive and 
abortion services and sexual health education (Center for Reproductive Rights 2011; National 
Women’s Law Center 2017; Sonfield 2017b, 2017a; White et al. 2015). 
An exploration of the variation of spending for reproductive healthcare services in the 
U.S. is thus particularly timely, and important. While many reports treat the U.S. as a single case, 
the degree of state autonomy around legislative action, including that for publicly-funded 
healthcare and for protecting reproductive rights, warrants a closer state-by-state comparison. I 
therefore proceed with this project by investigating variation in state-level policy and spending 
for family planning and abortion services in the last two decades. To do so, I draw on the broader 
literature of the racialized and gendered welfare state. I seek to develop an understanding of the 
extent to which race and gender inequalities are reinforced through seemingly beneficial social 
spending practices. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. I continue in this introductory chapter by offering a 
brief history of reproductive policy in the U.S. as well as a summary of the sociological study of 
reproduction. This is followed by a description of the theoretical framework that I will be 
pursuing for this project, specifically theories of the racialized and gendered welfare state. 
Finally, I close by offering more detailed information about my methodological choices, namely 
regression and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and data collection process. Three 
empirical chapters are pursued, followed by a more general conclusion. 
  3 
My first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, sets the stage for my investigation of spending for 
reproductive healthcare by considering how spending for Medicaid, the U.S.’s public healthcare 
program for citizens experiencing poverty, varies both between states and over time. Using 
expenditure data from the National Association of State Budget Officers, I consider how factors 
related to state wealth, poverty, and politics shape spending generosity. OLS and panel 
regression analyses are conducted on data from 2006-2016. Overall, results from this chapter 
offer support for the functional response of the state to poverty in shaping spending decisions. 
However, this response is tempered by the race of those experiencing poverty, such that we see 
different directions of association by between Black and White poverty levels and spending 
generosity. Additionally, this chapter highlights the extent to which variation does indeed exist 
between states, though perhaps less-so over time. 
Where Chapter 2 investigates correlates of healthcare spending more broadly, Chapter 3 
focuses more closely on spending for family planning services specifically. Several descriptive 
reports have noted how public funding for reproductive services in the United States differs both 
over time and between states (Frost, Frohwirth, and Purcell 2004; Hasstedt, Sonfield, and 
Benson Gold 2017), but few have sought to explain this variation empirically. Similarly, 
literature on the broader U.S. welfare state has not spent adequate time focusing on spending for 
reproductive healthcare, a particularly gendered and racialized social right. In this chapter, I thus 
explore how funding for family planning services, namely contraceptives and sterilization, vary 
between states between 2006 and 2015. Mimicking the analysis from Chapter 2, I proceed by 
exploring the extent to which functional factors that shape spending decisions are modified by 
the race of those in need of publicly funded contraceptives. Reproductive spending and need data 
come from reports by the Guttmacher Institute, an organization dedicated to researching sexual 
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and reproductive health both in the U.S. and internationally. Once again, findings from this 
chapter suggest that White women’s needs more positively influence spending generosity than 
do Black women’s needs. 
My third empirical chapter shifts the focus to policy around public funding for abortions 
specifically. Federal policy mandates that recipients of Medicaid be provided abortions under 
specific circumstances, such as threat of the woman’s life or pregnancies resulting from rape. 
While 17 of the 50 states have opted to spend additional funds for women pursuing an abortion 
under other circumstances, the majority of states, 33, maintain more restrictive policies around 
public funding of abortions. In Chapter 4, I thus apply theories of the gendered and racialized 
welfare state from the previous chapters to an investigation into which states present more 
restrictive policies and why, using data from 2014. Results broadly mimic those from Chapters 2 
and 3, with states that have higher levels of poverty and need among Black women generally 
failing provide more robust abortion funding. Additionally, I use this chapter to evaluate two 
different methodological approaches to comparative studies of the welfare state, regression and 
QCA. Where regression relies on linear algebra, QCA uses a Boolean approach that emphasizes 
the combinational and unsymmetrical nature of social phenomena. Results from the two 
approaches are similar to each other, yet those from QCA appear to make a stronger case for the 
role of Black women’s needs in shaping abortion policy. 
With this project I therefore contribute to the sociological literature in three ways. First, 
by including an empirical analysis of variation in spending for family planning and abortion 
services, I am applying theories put forth by welfare scholars to a less-investigated form of 
welfare, reproductive healthcare. In doing so, I am able to address the broader question of how 
states address or reproduce gender- and race-based inequalities through their policy decisions. 
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Second, in using both traditional regression and QCA, I am contributing to a current and ongoing 
methodological debate around measuring and analyzing state differences. Third, I am advocating 
for the importance of taking an intersectional approach to the research of welfare spending both 
by my methodological choices, and by my drawing from theory related to race and gender, as 
well as class. Gordon (1994) notes the racist and classist practices that took place in the first 
formalization of our definitions of welfare, and in failing to take these intersecting inequalities 
into account we risk oversimplifying realistically messy patterns of social injustice. In 
completing this project, I therefore hope to develop insights into both sociological method and 
theory that will contribute meaningfully to the field.  
 
1.1 Reproductive Healthcare in the United States 
Like many other social protections, support for reproductive healthcare in the United 
States has been in flux throughout the past century and a half and has involved a long list of 
stakeholders. Where medical professionals with Planned Parenthood highlight the importance of 
access to safe, affordable healthcare for women (Ota 2018), religious groups voice their concerns 
over the rights of the fetus (Greenhouse and Siegel 2012; Pew Research Center 2013; Steinberg 
2003). Where global environmental scholars recognize unsustainable population growth (Sasser 
2018), historians reveal the classist and racist underpinnings of population policy of the past 
(Borrero et al. 2014; Gurr 2011; Roberts 2014). And where politicians campaign staunchly for or 
against access to abortions (Carmon 2016), reproductive justice activists recognize how 
reproductive healthcare is tied up in a myriad of other social policies, including rights to 
childcare and safety (Luna and Luker 2013; Ross and Solinger 2017; SisterSong 2019). Within 
these debates, we come to understand the deep extent to which individual’s choices around 
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reproduction are hardly individual matters: “the personal is political” (Hanisch 2006). In this 
way, we can characterize the history of reproductive healthcare policy in the U.S. as one in 
which motives are seldom based solely on preserving women’s autonomy and social rights. 
The story of American policy surrounding reproductive healthcare often begins in the late 
1800s. At this time, women’s and maternal healthcare primarily took place under the supervision 
of midwives, with limited regulation or intervention by the government. Yet throughout the latter 
half of the 19th century, American doctors were undergoing a process of professionalization in 
which decisions were made surrounding which services could fall under the jurisdiction of 
midwives and which could be performed solely by doctors, vastly male, certified by the 
American Medical Association (AMA). In an act of monopolizing healthcare choices, the AMA 
succeeded in illegalizing abortions except those performed under their purview. This shift is 
recognized as a lasting step toward removing women’s bodily autonomy and placing 
reproductive healthcare choices in the hands of larger, male-dominated, institutions. 
Additionally, scholars recognize the extent to which this was a “professionalization project” 
(Luna and Luker 2013) meant to ensure the livelihoods of doctors, not, as many 20th century 
movements would argue, an issue of the “right to life.” 
Moving into the early 20th century, the role of the state in regulating reproductive 
behavior soon expanded beyond access to abortion. Racialized anxieties among White men and 
women grew steadily as they observed the rising birth rates of immigrant women and the 
decrease of births by White, middle class women of Anglo-Saxon descent. With the rise of the 
eugenics movement, questions as to who was morally fit to give birth and parent were 
intertwined with these fears, leading to policy and programs designed to curb births by women of 
color through contraception and sterilization, forced or otherwise. Simultaneously, abortions 
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among White women were discouraged by, among other things, the Comstock Act (Luna and 
Luker 2013). As with the AMA’s regulation of abortion, these policies and protocols reveal the 
extent to which reproductive healthcare decisions have been maintained by these larger 
institutions rather than by women themselves. Furthermore, they serve to undermine the 
garnering of equal rights by women of color and women who could not afford the private doctors 
willing to bend these rules (Luna and Luker 2013). 
These practices continued throughout the 20th century. Yet, the growing Civil Rights and 
Women’s movements began to shift public and political perception on the importance of access 
to affordable reproductive healthcare. Nevertheless, pushback remained. While support for the 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) grew across the 1970s, its association with legalizing abortion 
hurt its ratification. Similarly, the decision to nationally legalize abortion with Roe v. Wade in 
1973 was followed with ample opposition in the form of, for example, the Hyde Amendment, 
which limited how public funds could be used for said abortions. Decisions around access to 
reproductive healthcare remain in the spotlight today, as more states begin to pass Targeted 
Regulation of Abortion Provider (TRAP) laws in hopes of bringing cases up to the Supreme 
Court. Regardless, important to remember within these debates is that Roe was not decided on 
the basis of granting women access to necessary healthcare; rather it was determined that a 
decision to terminate a pregnancy remained under the purview of the woman and her doctor, 
echoing sentiments from 100 years prior. As we continue to encounter these debates surrounding 
equitable, non-coercive access to contraceptives, sterilizations, abortions, and sexual health 
education, it remains vital to consider the extent to which these policies work toward promoting 
or alleviating pre-existing inequalities. 
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In our current social-political space, we have been observing the restriction of access to 
reproductive healthcare services that disproportionately hurts poor women of color. This presents 
scholars and healthcare practitioners with a tension, in turn described as the “too much/too little 
dilemma” (Joffe 2018; Joffe and Reich 2014) or the “contraceptive paradox” (Mann 2018). 
Namely, how do we promote the equal accessibility of reproductive healthcare services without 
entering into coercive practices? In other words, how can reproductive healthcare policy 
equitably ensure women’s rights to healthcare? In developing the reproductive justice approach, 
groups such as SisterSong  recognize the importance of respecting womxn’s intersecting 
identities and their “human right to maintain personal bodily autonomy, have children, not have 
children, and parent the children we have in safe and sustainable communities” (SisterSong 
2019). By applying a reproductive justice framework to current healthcare policy, perhaps some 
of the previous harms of policies that fail to center the experiences of marginalized women can 
be righted. 
 
2 THEORY 
While understudied within the welfare state literature, spending and support for 
reproductive healthcare is to be considered a social protection. Drawing on work by Marshall 
(1950) and Rawls (1971), Almgren (2017) makes a compelling argument for the consideration of 
healthcare as a universal right within a developed democracy. Reproductive rights carry certain 
social and political weight that more broad notions of healthcare may not, yet they do indeed 
confer the social rights, particularly to women, that assist in the actualization of political and 
civil rights. The argument for including spending on reproductive health in discussions of social 
rights is strengthened when we consider the positive impacts experienced by women, and society 
  9 
as a whole, when these services are more readily accessible (Frost et al. 2014; Frost, Finer, and 
Tapales 2008; Kavanaugh and Andersen 2016). In this section, I thus proceed first by offering 
definitions of reproduction from a sociological perspective, followed by a summary of 
conventional theories of welfare state development. After highlighting welfare state research on 
the U.S. case, I go on to incorporate arguments on the ways in which gender and race are 
intertwined with our notions of social support. A summary of the six general hypotheses 
developed in this section can be seen in Table 1.1. 
 
2.1 The Sociology of Reproduction 
The larger body of scholarship on the sociology of reproduction is a relative newcomer to 
the sociological cannon. Whereas early research considered reproduction to be a biological, 
linear process experienced by the individual, sociologists recognize its inherently social nature 
(for a review see Almeling (2015). As such, early scholarship on the sociology of reproduction 
defines reproduction as: “encompass[ing] events throughout the human and especially female 
life-cycle related to ideas and practices surrounding fertility, birth, and childcare, including the 
ways these figure into understandings of social and cultural renewal” (Ginsburg and Rapp 
1991:311). Murphy (2012:6) expands this definition: “Reproduction was not a biological thing 
with clear bounds, but a multifaceted and distributed effect in time and space, a problem both 
material and political to which questions of state, race, freedom, individuality, and economic 
prosperity were bound in ways that connected the micrological with the transnational via 
embodiment.” 
As suggested by this second definition, the four primary foci within the scholarship on 
reproduction all engage with the role of the state in shaping reproductive practices. The first two, 
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“disciplining reproduction” (Clarke and Clarke 1998) and “reproductive governance” (Morgan 
and Roberts 2012) pay special attention to the role of power in reproductive politics. Together 
they investigate the question of “how the process of disciplining or governing reproduction 
varies across social realms, from medicine to the state or the family and beyond” (Almeling 
2015:433). From this framework, we can understand the extent to which, for example, welfare 
policies that maintain family size limits serve as the state exercising coercive power onto 
reproductive choices. The other two perspectives, stratified reproduction (Colen 1995) and 
reproductive justice (Luna and Luker 2013; Ross and Solinger 2017; SisterSong 2019), 
emphasize how this coercive action impacts women of different identities and social positions 
unequally. In doing so, they advocate for reproductive policy that alleviates inequalities along 
multiple axes: of gender, race, class, sexuality, immigration status, and ability, among others. 
Though not actively contested within this project, these theories of reproduction serve as 
important groundwork from which my research stems. For the rest of this project I thus rely on 
the notion of reproduction as a social, not merely biological or individual, phenomenon. In 
particular, this project speaks to the role of the state in shaping our collective understanding and 
experiences of reproduction, as well as how the access to wield state power is stratified by both 
gender and race. 
 
2.2 Conventional Theories of Welfare State Development 
Conventional theorists of the welfare state tend to distinguish between functional 
controls, such as state wealth and need, and the political space, as well as citizens’ ability to 
capitalize on their political rights.1 In particular, I draw from Huber and Stephens’ (2010) notion 
                                                 
1 For reviews see: Amenta, Bonastia, and Caren (2001); Howard (1999); Myles and Quadagno (2002); Quadagno 
(1987); and Skocpol and Amenta (1986). 
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of power constellations, in which “State policy is a result of power relations in society, mediated 
by political institutions” (p. 13). Where Huber and Stephens (2010) incorporate gender into the 
conventional class-based argument, I also incorporate race, as detailed further below. 
First, functionalist arguments highlight how basic need for, and ability to support, 
extensive social spending varies between countries. Several scholars recognize the industrial 
revolution as a turning point in welfare development, as the increase in state capital allows for 
excess funds to be reinvested in a state’s citizenry (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975). 
Functionalists often operationalize this through analysis of a state’s level of industrialization 
(Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975) yet empirical support is lacking (Misra 2002; Skocpol and 
Amenta 1986). This is particularly true in the U.S. case, which some suggest is due to the 
development of democratic processes prior to the industrial revolution (De Swaan 1988; 
Quadagno 1996; Skocpol 1992). Regardless, all told, the functionalist perspective suggests that 
wealthier states, as well as states with higher need, will offer more generous social spending 
(H1). 
While a functionalist perspective emphasizes industrialization as a catalyst for welfare 
state growth, others recognize industrialization as fueling a space in which workers can advocate 
for the social protections provided by the state. That is, with the large labor force necessary to 
support an industrialized state, workers gain the bargaining power needed to advocate for social 
(labor) protections. Thus scholars focusing on power resources suggest that the “Balance of class 
power determines welfare state outcomes” (Misra 2002). Furthermore, these scholars contend 
that the advent of social support is not in the service of the citizens, but rather the capitalists, in 
that supporting workers maintains their complacency within the capitalist system (Huber and 
Stephens 2010; Misra 2002). In this way, they highlight the tension described earlier surrounding 
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the intentions of social policy and its role in perpetuating inequality: To what extent do these 
social supports, in failing to address larger systems of capitalist oppression, do little to ultimately 
help workers? Regardless, from comparative work, we see that where there exists a strong labor 
party, unionization, or working class movement, there also exists a larger welfare state (Korpi 
1989; Quadagno 1987; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). I thus expect that states with a more engaged 
populace that has broader access to participate in democratic processes will have more generous 
spending (H2). 
In considering the extent to which citizens advocate for these social rights, it is equally 
important to understand the political context in which these actions and decisions are taking 
place (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003; Cauthen and Amenta 1996; Quadagno 1987; Skocpol and 
Amenta 1986). When examining the role of industrialization, for example, some scholars suggest 
that the extent to which industrialization and democratization developed coincidentally within a 
state is reflected in their social spending (De Swaan 1988; Quadagno 1996; Skocpol 1992). 
Other factors of the political space include party identification of legislatures, with non-Southern 
democratic states more likely to support welfare spending,2 as well as the role of “policy 
legacies” or “policy feedbacks” (Quadagno 2004; Skocpol and Amenta 1986) on later policy 
choices. Similarly, a more recent body of scholarship suggests that public opinion, too, falls 
under this approach (Brooks and Manza 2006b, 2006a; Grammich, DaVanzo, and Stewart 2004; 
Kail and Dixon 2011) given the close tie between public opinion and policy (Burstein 1998, 
2003), particularly at the state level (Cook et al. 1992; Jelen and Wilcox 2003). Together, this 
                                                 
2 The reluctance of Southern Democrats to adopt welfare policies throughout history is well documented, and we 
can see the link between agendas of powerful actors and decisions by politicians especially clearly in the 
development of U.S. welfare policy (Gordon 1994). The relevance of the Democratic party is specific to the U.S. 
case, where a strong labor party is lacking (Quadagno 1987). 
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scholarship suggests that states with more a liberal-leaning government and populace, as well as 
a history of support for reproductive services, will spend more generously (H3). 
 
2.2.1 U.S. Exceptionalism 
This extensive literature offers evidence for the conditions associated with a developed 
welfare state; nonetheless, much of the original scholarship considers the U.S. as a single, 
national context. In reality, policy decisions around many social provisions, including healthcare, 
often take place at the state level, given the relative autonomy of the states inherent in U.S. social 
policy (Amenta and Carruthers 1988; Greentree, Lombard, and Morris 2011; Skocpol and 
Ikenberry 1983). As evidence of this, several studies consider the disparate health outcomes 
experienced by U.S. citizens based on various characteristics, including state of residence (see 
Wright and Perry [2010] for a review). As an implication of these discrepancies, these authors 
call for greater regulation of healthcare at the federal level, particularly for disadvantaged 
groups. 
More generally, the United States is known for its two-tiered social spending system, 
(Goldberg 2007; Gordon 1994; Hacker 2002; Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1996). Here, top-tier 
programs, such as unemployment and social security, have relatively generous funding and 
public support, while second-tier programs, colloquially referred to as “welfare” in the U.S., 
remain means-tested and meager, with recipients often being portrayed as “undeserving.” In this 
way, the U.S. serves as a particularly unique location for studying how cultural and political 
forces influence spending for social welfare, particularly for programs that are relegated to this 
“second tier” such as spending for reproductive healthcare. 
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2.3 Racialized and Gendered Welfare State 
In their gender-based criticisms of both Esping-Andersen (1990) and Marshall (1950), 
many feminist scholars point to the male-centered definitions and measures of welfare employed 
by these authors (Bacchi 1999; Lewis 1992; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Orloff 1996; 
Sainsbury 1996). Other scholars equally recognize the role of racialized institutions in shaping 
policy decisions, particularly within the U.S. case (Brown 2013; Misra 2002; Reese, Ramirez, 
and Estrada-Correa 2013). Given Almeling’s (2015) call for reproductive research to more 
deeply incorporate racialized and gendered social processes, for this project I draw from research 
by welfare state scholars who recognize the role of race and gender in policy decision-making, as 
summarized below. 
 
2.3.1 Intersectionality 
In order to speak to the role of race and gender in shaping social and political processes, I 
first describe the framework of intersectionality and its application to the welfare state literature. 
Intersectionality as a formal field of research comes from work by Collins (2000), Crenshaw 
(1991), and Hooks (2000). These scholars, among others, recognized that one’s lived experience 
is not a strict summation of each of their various social identities. Rather, a combination of a 
myriad of social factors may result in differential identity development and treatment by both 
individuals and institutions. In their advocating for the use of a reproductive justice framework in 
research, policy, and practice, groups such as SisterSong (2019) directly apply such 
intersectional perspectives. 
More recently, scholars have questioned what it means to pursue truly intersectional 
research. These discussions have taken the form of both definitional and methodological debates. 
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In considering the perspective of socialist feminists, for example, Zinn and Dill (1996) note that 
the evaluation of gender and class inequalities notably excludes race, and question the extent to 
which this represents intersectionality. Choo and Ferree (2010) provide a summary of the various 
descriptors scholars have used in their discussion of these experiences, such as “complex 
inequality” (McCall 2001), “matrix of domination” (Collins 2000), or “intersectional” (Crenshaw 
1991). Similar definitional questions are posed by Collins (2015) and Davis (2008). Collins 
(2015) and others also comment on how intersectionality gets operationalized from an analytic 
perspective. These authors indicate how intersectionality expands beyond race-class-gender to 
include identities related to sexuality, age, and ability.3 
Together, this literature suggests that the identities of race and gender play a role in the 
functional-, power-, and political-based processes associated with welfare state development. 
That is, while social spending support is clearly a class issue, it is just as equally a race and 
gender issue as well. 
 
2.3.2 Gender and the Welfare State 
In response to these seemingly gender-neutral economic- and politics-based explanations, 
several feminist scholars criticize this lack of reference to gender and its operation through the 
state. From Acker (1990, 2006) and Walby (1994), we understand how policy that may be 
intended to be gender-neutral is more realistically gender-blind in its assumption of a man as the 
default citizen. First, these authors note how programs defined broadly as welfare do not 
necessarily equally serve men and women (Bacchi 1999; Lewis 1992; O’Connor et al. 1999; 
Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1996). This is especially evident in the US case; whereas we see praise 
                                                 
3 More on the methodology on intersectional research can be seen in the “Methodology” section below. 
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for Social Security and unemployment insurance, both of which are targeted at (predominantly 
male) workers, we see stigmatization of programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), and Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), which are directed primarily 
at mothers and children (Goldberg 2007; Gordon 1994; Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1996). This 
imbalance can further be seen in the fact that family assistance is means-tested, and very limited 
in scope4. Additionally, given the “feminization of poverty” described by Pearce (1978), and the 
traditional gender roles dictated to women, their need for state-sponsored programs is unique. In 
this way, we are concerned with not just the extent of poverty within a state, but specifically the 
proportion of women that are experiencing poverty. This leads to the hypothesis that higher 
levels of women in need of publicly funded healthcare will reflect more generous spending on 
the part of the state (H4). 
Many feminist scholars criticize the male-centered definitions and measures of welfare 
employed by conventional welfare state scholars, yet few push definitions of welfare spending 
past those of monetary assistance for individuals or families. O’Connor et al. (1999) notably 
devote space in their book to discuss the gender implications of patriarchal states, including 
those related to family planning, abortion, and eugenics. In particular their discussion of 
reproductive rights as medical versus body rights helps to situate these policies within 
frameworks developed by previous scholars. Nevertheless, the extent to which scholars have 
empirically tested how different factors are related to spending for reproductive care, as they 
have for other types of welfare spending, remains limited. Therefore a more gender-sensitive 
approach to the study of welfare state development does well to consider outcomes either 
                                                 
4 With the 1996 welfare reform, for example, a mother can only be on TANF for a maximum of two years of her life 
(Hahn et al. 2017). 
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directly targeted at women (i.e. reproductive healthcare) or else stereotypically associated with 
women’s heteronormative roles (e.g. healthcare). 
When considering the unique position of reproductive healthcare within the social 
spending hierarchy, it is worthwhile to note the fundamentally gendered nature of reproductive 
spending. A woman’s traditional familial role associates her with care-taking at large (Knijn and 
Kremer 1997; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010; Shelton and John 1996), and needs for 
reproductive healthcare remain that much more gender-specific. Of studies that explore the 
gendered nature of welfare spending within the U.S., most have focused on those programs 
geared toward female heads-of household (Bentele and Nicoli 2012; Kail and Dixon 2011; Misra 
and Moller 1998; Moller 2002; Pearson 2007). Programs such as Aid to Dependent Children 
(ADC), AFDC, and TANF all provide assistance to women, but it is via their role in caring for 
children. It is uniquely with reproductive healthcare that we see spending targeted at women 
themselves, regardless of their parental status. Juxtaposing correlates for spending for 
reproductive care against those previously studied, like AFDC, allows comparison of two 
contrasting images of women in society: woman-as-mother and woman-as-potential mother. 
Thus in exploring variation in spending for reproductive healthcare, this project expands our 
definition of social spending and social rights. 
In addition to the gendered nature of welfare’s operationalization, a question remains as 
to what sorts of environments lead to more or less welfare generosity under a feminist lens. This 
has also been addressed by feminist scholars, who note, for example, that not only do the 
political views of those who have power matter, but also the gender of those with political power 
(Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Paxton, Green, and Hughes 2008; Poggione 2004). Whether this 
be operationalized as the proportion of female legislatures (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; 
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Caiazza 2004; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009), or the proportion of women voters, women’s 
representation matters. Similarly, as increased unionization is associated with more generosity, 
so too is women’s participation in the labor force, and the representational power that it brings 
(Volgy, Schwarz, and Gottlieb 1986). From this work, I predict that states with more women in 
legislation and proportionally more women actively voting will result in increased generosity of 
spending for welfare services (H5). 
 
2.3.4 Race and the Welfare State 
Similarly, other scholars indicate the role that race and racism play in shaping welfare 
policy. Many of these studies are historical in nature, pointing to specific points in America’s 
history when policies failed to help, or explicitly disenfranchised, people of color, and women of 
color in particular (Gordon 1994; Quadagno 1996; Schram, Soss, and Fording 2003). In 
considering family assistance spending, for example, we see how Black women were excluded 
from the formal decision-making processes surrounding the 1935 Social Security Act (Gordon 
1994). Furthermore, many of these policies were written with the purposeful exclusion of Black 
laborers, as evidenced by the lack of economic protection granted to agricultural and domestic 
workers (Gordon 1994; Misra and Moller 1998). We see this further playing out in the 
assumption of White, upper-middle class, Protestant parenting norms as the measure for proper 
parenting techniques (Gordon 1994). 
In describing the literature on the racialized welfare state, Reese et al. (2013) highlight 
two conflicting theories. First, the “power in numbers” or critical “mass” hypothesis (Blalock 
1967; Glenn 2004; Kanter 2008; McAdam 2010) suggests that the larger the presence of a 
minoritized group, the more power they will have in shaping a legislative agenda. At odds with 
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this is the “threat” (Key 1949) or “power threat” (Blalock 1967) hypothesis, which suggests that 
as a minoritized group grows, the group in power (e.g. upper-middle class White Americans) 
begins to feel threatened, and thus pushes back against these groups through legislation. Work by 
Brown (2013) similarly suggests that racialized conflict leads to more restrictive welfare 
policies. 
To better understand these phenomena, I draw on the work by Omi and Winant (1986) as 
well as the follow-up volume HoSang, LaBennett, and Pulido (2012). In their foundational work, 
Omi and Winant (1986) describe the ways in which our perceptions of race are constantly 
formed and reformed through social interactions and institutions. Similarly, critical race theory 
emphasizes the role of a White supremacist state in perpetuating injustices against people of 
color (Delgado and Stefancic 2012; Feagin 2013). In this way, we can recognize how policy 
intending to protect citizens may indeed fail to account for the experiences of people of color, or 
purposely apply additional injustices. More empirically, research by scholars such as Dawson 
(2003), Hutchings and Valentino (2004), and Whitby (1987) describes how power dynamics and 
political institutions are shaped by the needs of African-American voters. Importantly, scholars 
also highlight how these racial processes intertwine with some of the gendered processes 
described above (Kandaswamy 2012). 
Additional empirical evidence reinforces the association between racial politics and 
social spending generosity. Kail and Dixon (2011), Misra and Moller (1998), Moller (2002), 
Reese (2001), and Sander and Giertz (1986), among others, find that the racial makeup of a state 
impacts welfare generosity such that African-Americans’ needs remain under-supported. On the 
other hand, the racialized history of family planning and related services in the U.S. (Correa and 
Reichmann 1994; Farrell, Dawkins, and Oliver 1983; Greil et al. 2011; Gurr 2011; Joffe and 
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Parker 2012; King and Meyer 1997; Roberts 2014; Volscho 2010) might suggest that a state 
having higher proportions of women of color would be associated with increased funding for 
these services. Nevertheless, recent reports indicate the lack of availability of these services, 
particularly for women of color (Howell and Starrs 2017). Here I thus hypothesize that spending 
generosity will be more reflective of the needs of White women than of Black women (H6). 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
Research on the welfare state has long served as a platform for the debate on quantitative 
methodological choices and preferences. As evidenced by empirical tests mentioned above, 
many welfare scholars opt for traditional regression techniques when examining variations in 
spending between states or over time. Regression is often favored by the comparative 
sociological community, given its popularity in the social sciences more broadly (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2012). Yet correlation-based techniques have their limitations (Ragin 2008, 2014).5 
Similarly, scholars applying an intersectional framework question the extent to which these more 
conventional methods are able to capture the multi-faceted nature of identity-based inequities 
that underpin this perspective (McCall 2005; Prins 2006). Often a preference for qualitative over 
quantitative methods is found within this literature, putting it somewhat at odds to traditional 
approaches to studying comparative welfare states. 
One method that has been developed to somewhat bridge the gap between quantitative 
and qualitative paradigms is qualitative comparative analysis, or QCA (Ragin 2008; Rubinson 
and Ragin 2007). First, where regression requires many cases over many years in order to 
achieve statistical significance, QCA is suited for the “small N” analysis. Second, where 
                                                 
5 For an in-depth comparison of these approaches, see the Symposium on Methodology in Comparative Research in 
Mjöset and Clausen (2007). 
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regression results are based on correlations between variables, those from QCA reflect 
membership of cases into either fuzzy (scaled) or crisp (nominal) sets. In applying set theory, 
connections in QCA are allowed to be asymmetrical (for example, all states with higher spending 
may have democratic governors, but not all democratic governors necessarily hold office in 
states with high spending). The same is not true for correlational relationships, and in this way, 
we can consider a more nuanced form of what it means for two conditions (or variables) to be 
related to each other. Finally, QCA’s use of combinations of conditions rather than a single 
correlational relationship suits research that takes an intersectional framework.6 
Thus, within this project, two different methodological techniques are pursued: regression 
(including ordinary least squares, panel models, and logistic) and QCA. Specifically, Chapter 2 
makes use of the longitudinal data on Medicaid spending by conducting panel regressions, as 
well as OLS regressions on averaged data and one-year lagged regressions on the most recent 
annual data. In Chapter 3, I again employ OLS regression on averaged and annual data on 
spending for family planning at three specific time points. Finally, Chapter 4 offers a side-by-
side comparison of fuzzy-set QCA and binary logistic regression, given my dichotomous 
outcome (whether or not a state has restrictive public funding for abortion). Here, in addition to 
providing robustness checks with the use of both methods, I am also able to compare the extent 
to which each is suited for evaluating questions of social spending variation. 
 
4 DATA 
Data for this dissertation come from a long list of publicly available sources. Here I offer 
a description of the data collection process, as well as suggestions on the limitations of the 
                                                 
6 The exception to this is in the inclusion of an interaction term, but a single interaction term still remains a poor 
proxy for the complicated ways in which multiple social factors overlap with each other to produce an outcome. 
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specific explanatory factors I have chosen. More detail on the specific variables/conditions can 
be seen in each empirical chapter. 
A full list of variables and their sources can be seen in Table 1.2. The selection of these 
specific sources was made based on availability and reliability of each dataset. These include 
governmental publications from, for example, the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Economic 
analysis, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Additional data was culled from sources more 
narrowly focused on specific topics, such as state spending data from the National Association of 
State Budget Officers, party affiliation data from the National Council of State legislatures, and 
female political representation statistics from the Center for American Women and Politics. Data 
related to reproductive healthcare comes predominantly from reports by the Guttmacher Institute. 
This Institute is a non-profit organization that conducts scholarly research on and advocates for 
reproductive and sexual health, both in the U.S. and globally. While their role as advocates may 
suggest bias in these reports, the methodological rigor described as well as the credentials of the 
authors offer validity to their findings. 
In collecting this data, I endeavored to select sources that were consistent across time 
points and had been previously used by scholars of the U.S. welfare state. Thus, even though the 
time span that I could study for this project, 2006-2016, remains somewhat limited, I am able to 
aggregate the most currently relevant data. Future research would benefit from an even more 
longitudinal approach to spending on healthcare at large, and reproductive healthcare 
specifically. 
Another major limitation to using some of these aggregate sources of data is the extent to 
which they allow me to target the sometimes more subtle role of race and gender in shaping 
policy decisions. For example, while this data offers a comprehensive view of state population 
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and voting counts, data on Black population and voting rates in which these numbers are 
particularly small become unreliable.7 Similarly, I was able gather information on female 
political representation, but I was not able to find data on Black, and particularly Black female, 
representation as readily. Going forward, I would hope to be able to incorporate more nuanced 
measures of Black political and class power. 
Similarly, even with the long list of factors I have incorporated in this project, there are 
several other factors I could not include given the scope of the project. For example, just as I 
disaggregate measures such as poverty and voting participation by race, so too would I like to 
disaggregate unemployment. Additionally, other measures related to both functional and 
power/political perspectives could easily be included, such as labor force participation, judicial 
conservatism, and the presence of social movement organizations. Perhaps a gradient scale for 
the severity of Jim Crow laws would prove particularly illuminating. Nevertheless, with this 
wide variety of data I am able to represent the range of welfare state factors, and in particular 
highlight how these are shaped by race and gender processes within the state. 
 
  
                                                 
7 Indeed, for certain state-year combinations, Black voting data is unavailable (see chapters for detail). In other 
cases, the denominator was particularly small such that percentage calculations remain biased upward for these 
measures. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TEMPORAL AND GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN MEDICAID INVESTMENTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The United States serves as a unique case for understanding changes in healthcare policy. 
Unlike many of its wealthy, democratic counterparts, the U.S. fails to provide universal public 
healthcare to its citizens. Access to quality healthcare has recently been brought to the political 
forefront, thanks to the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, followed by a promise for its 
repeal from the current administration. Not surprisingly, it remains starkly on the public’s mind 
as well (Grogan and Park 2017). In order to better understand the advent of recent changes, as 
well as how they are manifested differently in different parts of the country, I look to the 
literature on welfare state development at large.  
Historically, much of the literature devoted to welfare state development in the U.S. has 
been concerned with spending for social security and unemployment. More recently, scholars 
have indicated the importance of expanding our notion of welfare spending to include other 
forms of support (Bentele and Nicoli 2012; Kail and Dixon 2011; Moller 2002), such as Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF). Citing both their historical development and current manifestation, these authors 
indicate the utility of researching the funding of these services separately from the more robust 
unemployment or social security funding. 
From this understanding of the roots of welfare state development, many scholars have 
further pursued the question of how welfare states differ in terms of their healthcare services. In 
particular, Almgren’s (2017) recent work combines Marshall’s (1950) and Rawls’ (1971) 
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theoretical frameworks to highlight the importance of considering healthcare among those rights 
inherent to citizenship. I thus use this chapter to apply these conventional theories of welfare 
state spending to an under-studied topic in the welfare state literature, publicly funded healthcare 
in the United States. 
Several scholars have critically examined the differential health outcomes of citizens 
living in various welfare state regimes. Overall, studies highlight the positive impact a protective 
welfare state regime has on its citizens’ health (Muntaner et al. 2011). For example, In 
Olafsdottir’s (2007) comparison of the U.S. and Iceland, the author finds that in Iceland, wealth 
is less associated with positive health outcomes than in the U.S., citing its protective social net. 
Similarly, Beckfield and Bambra (2016), claim that “the U.S. mortality disadvantage is, in part, a 
welfare state disadvantage” in their study of the relatively high mortality rates of the U.S. 
population. The impact of disparate health outcomes on public opinion of healthcare spending is 
also, importantly, tempered by the model that each country uses (Kikuzawa, Olafsdottir, and 
Pescosolido 2008). 
While this extensive literature offers evidence for the connection between welfare state 
regime and health outcomes, most of these studies consider the U.S. as a single, national context. 
In reality, policy decisions around many social provisions, including healthcare, often take place 
at the state level, given the relative autonomy of the states inherent to U.S. democracy. As such, 
several studies consider the disparate health outcomes experienced by U.S. citizens based on 
various characteristics, including state of residence (see Wright and Perry [2010] for a review). 
Part of the difficulty of studying healthcare in the U.S. context is the patchwork nature of 
the U.S. health insurance process. This comes in part from the fact that even within a national 
policy context, many healthcare-related decisions are relegated to the states. This also arises due 
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to the availability of private insurance to cover Americans’ healthcare costs. Importantly, when 
measuring the availability and presence of public health insurance in the U.S. context, I am not 
necessarily measuring the extent to which Americans as a whole are protected from healthcare 
costs. Rather, I am taking the standpoint offered by the welfare state literature that indicates the 
importance/necessity of a state providing support for basic needs to its citizens, regardless of 
their status (Almgren 2017). In the U.S. case, most often, private insurance is tied to employment 
or familial relations, thus resulting in its failure to serve as a universal good. Therefore, 
conclusions that I draw here, based on access to public insurance, though not speaking to the use 
of health insurance in the U.S. at large, are still meaningful in their implications for better 
understanding support for universal basic rights. 
In this chapter, I explore the extent to which support for Medicaid varies both over time 
and between states. I perform a series of regressions on two outcomes: Medicaid spending per 
state GDP and per total social spending. My primary analytic technique is panel-corrected 
standard error regression, as data represents spending both over time and between states. The 
outcome itself comes from the National Association of State Budget Officers’ reports from the 
years 2006-2016. In doing so, I am able to capture the wide differences in political contexts 
between states, as well as changes in funding for Medicaid over time, including before and after 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act. Thus, this chapter offers an extension of the welfare state 
literature to a particularly timely topic, as well as suggests that state choice to invest more or less 
in their Medicaid program is predominantly driven by state wealth and need (though mediated by 
race), and to a lesser extent, political factors. In doing so, it sets the stage for the following two 
empirical chapters. 
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1.1 Public Healthcare in the United States: Medicaid 
The United States is often typified in the comparative literature as an “exceptional” case 
when it comes to its perspective on social politics. This categorization is based on, among other 
things, America’s emphasis on equality over equity, its delegation of responsibilities to state and 
local levels (Almgren 2017), and its rhetoric of “rugged individualism” as being vital to 
American economy and democratic spirit. Healthcare is no exception to this exceptionalism. 
Rather than being included in a package of guaranteed rights from the state, like all other 
industrialized democracies (Quadagno 2006), U.S. health insurance is tied to employment. This 
has historically left large swaths of the American public without affordable healthcare (Brown 
1983). Thus, in order to address the needs of uninsured Americans, the federal government has, 
on-and-off, implemented joint federal-state grant programs directed toward healthcare since the 
early 1900s (see Brown [1983], Haeder and Weimer [2015], and Moore and Smith [2005] for 
summaries). In particular, the Social Security Act of 1935 provided funding for healthcare 
services directed at specific groups: mothers, children, the elderly, and the blind. Importantly, 
however, efforts to consider national health insurance programs within the Act were quashed, in 
part due to lobbying by the medical industry (Brown 1983). 
It was with the 1965 Social Security Act amendments that Medicaid itself took shape. In 
its current form, Medicaid serves approximately 20% of the American public (Garfield, 
Rudowitz, and Damico 2018). Yet the development of the program has been closely tied with 
welfare at large. Indeed, eligibility was originally based on participation in welfare programs 
such as Aid to the Blind, AFDC, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (Moore and 
Smith 2005). This importantly excluded certain individuals who were in need of access to 
reduced healthcare costs but were not eligible for welfare funds. Additionally, implementation 
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across the states was far from consistent. It took 16 years before all fifty states offered Medicaid 
programs (Haeder and Weimer 2015), and those states with the poorest populations often offered 
the most limited services (Moore and Smith 2005). Overall, this resulted in a program that “even 
the authors saw…as an important, but limited step which left large gaps in coverage” (Moore and 
Smith 2005:51). 
In this way, we can recognize certain parallels between the development of Medicaid and 
the development and implementation of welfare at large. First, when the Social Security Act 
passed, it contained a limited version of those services advocated for by women’s groups, and in 
particular, by Black women (Gordon 1994). These activists recognized the importance of robust 
healthcare coverage in working toward establishing a more equitable society, yet their cause was 
overruled by the time the Act landed on Roosevelt’s desk. Second, it is worth noting the extent to 
which Medicaid may be considered on the “lower tier” of social services (Brown 1983; Hacker 
2002; Meyer 1994).1 Where Medicare, a social insurance program, is seen as a service earned by 
the deserving, the eligibility requirements of Medicaid, a public assistance program, remain 
highly contested (Garfield et al. 2018). While the Affordable Care Act allowed for Medicaid 
expansion, states were still given the right not to opt-in to this expansion, with results echoing 
those from its initial implementation in terms of the poor being disproportionately affected (Pear 
2013). Third, scholarship recognizes both the extent to which people of color, and women of 
color in particular have persistently worse access to quality healthcare (Greene, Blustein, and 
Weitzman 2006; Sommers et al. 2017). From Meyer (1994: 12), “the U.S. long-term care system 
stratifies by default; to the extent that U.S. social policy fails to take steps to alleviate gender and 
race inequality generated by social and market forces, the welfare state stratifies by gender and 
                                                 
1 This division is questioned by Howard (1999). 
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race.” Thus, the precarious nature of public assistance-based aid in part perpetuates the 
discrimination experienced by individuals in these groups. All told, this results in a program that 
almost belongs in a category of its own when being compared to the healthcare programs in other 
countries. 
 
2 THEORY 
I employ racialized and gendered theories of welfare state development in exploring 
variation in Medicaid spending by state and over time. The literature on the welfare state is well-
developed, though tests are more often conducted on cross-national datasets and to spending 
outcomes other than healthcare. Nevertheless, it serves as a good foundation for establishing the 
extent to which healthcare spending follows conventional theories of welfare state development. 
Hypotheses here reflect those from the introductory chapter and are summarized in Table 1.1. 
 
2.1 Conventional Theories of Welfare State Development 
As offered in more detail in Chapter 1, this literature is often divided into two groups: 
functional arguments of wealth and need, and power/political arguments of citizen engagement 
and political context. First, functionalists argue that state wealth and need drive spending 
(Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975), so that we would expect that states with higher GDP per capita 
would spend more generously, as would states with higher levels of poverty (H1). Second, other 
scholars emphasize the role that collective tools of the citizen play (Korpi 1989; Misra 2002; 
Quadagno 1987; Skocpol and Amenta 1986), such that with higher engagement in the form of 
unionization and higher voter turnout we would expect to see more generous Medicaid spending 
(H2). Third still others contend that political makeup of the state legislature, alongside access to 
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a legacy of support for social spending, engenders more robust welfare state support (Barrilleaux 
and Berkman 2003; Cauthen and Amenta 1996; Quadagno 1987; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). 
Here, thus, we would expect that more democratic-leaning states have more generous spending, 
as would states without strict voter ID laws (H3). In addition, political institutionalists 
acknowledge the role of the political legacy of the South as an exception in both the historical 
agenda of the Democratic party as well as its agricultural legacy (Gordon 1994). Research 
suggests that Southern states will tend to have less support for social services than their non-
Southern counterparts (H3). 
 
2.1.1 The U.S. Case 
More specific to the United States, one set of studies considers why states exhibit greater 
or lesser support for healthcare spending. Miller (2005) offers an in-depth summary of studies 
dedicated to explaining variation in healthcare policy and spending in the U.S. In doing so, he 
provides a useful model for understanding the combination of factors both internal and external 
to a state that impact healthcare policy decisions, while highlighting a lack of attention to the 
impact of political factors. Some research indicates political predictors have a limited association 
with Medicaid spending (Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt 1991), though most suggest it 
confers some impact. 
Grogan (1994), for example, develops a political-economic theory to explain variation in 
Medicaid policy, highlighting that different indicators related to Medicaid policy are reflective of 
different political processes. Similarly, Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) point to the importance of 
politics, but emphasize that we must look beyond party preference to understand deeper causes 
of variation in Medicaid policy, particularly for recent expansions. Where Grogan and Patashnik 
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(2003) highlight the lasting impact of how Medicaid policy unfolded in 1965, Quadagno (2010) 
points to the healthcare reform bills in 2010 as an example of how policy is not solely reflective 
of its roots. Finally, in an attempt to uncover why the U.S. remains a public healthcare laggard, 
Quadagno (2004) points to the roles of medical professionals acting in the political sphere as 
stakeholder mobilizers. 
 
2.2 Race, Gender, and the Welfare state 
With an acknowledgement of the roles that race and gender play in shaping policy in 
general, and healthcare policy in particular (Gordon 1994; Luna and Luker 2013), I also draw 
from the literature on the racialized and gendered U.S. welfare state. Within the literature on race 
and the state, scholars recognize that the presence of a minoritized group in a state can shape 
spending outcomes (Reese, Ramirez, and Estrada-Correa 2013). The threat hypothesis (Key 
1949), for example, suggests that as the presence of a minoritized group rises, policy is 
developed in opposition to their collective needs and desires. Simultaneously, the power in 
numbers hypothesis (Blalock 1967) would suggest otherwise: that with larger proportions of 
minoritized citizens in a state, the more generous spending is. The opposing and often non-linear 
relationships described by these theories make interpretation for this project difficult, particularly 
given the macroscopic scale of the data. Where these debates emphasize the role of 
representation within the population in shaping policy, another set of scholars describe the extent 
to which policy itself alleviates or aggravates preexisting instances of inequality (Delgado and 
Stefancic 2012; Meyer 1994). From this literature, we would expect that regardless of population 
representation, Medicaid spending generosity would be more representative of the needs of 
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White than Black citizens. In other words, I expect high White representation and poverty levels 
to be more tightly associated with spending generosity than those for Black Americans (H6). 
In the gendered welfare state literature, scholars point to the role that female makeup of 
the legislation plays in shaping spending outcomes (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Paxton, 
Green, and Hughes 2008; Poggione 2004). The United States is known for its two-tiered social 
spending system, in which top-tier programs, such as unemployment and social security, have 
relatively generous funding and public support. Meanwhile second-tier programs, such as AFDC 
and TANF, remain means-tested and meager, with recipients often being portrayed as 
“undeserving” (Goldberg 2007; Gordon 1994; Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1996). As these scholars 
and others (O’Connor et al. 1999; Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1996) suggest, social spending 
decisions do not take place in a gender-neutral vacuum. Rather, policy decisions based on 
“women’s issues,” including healthcare, can be reflective of gendered processes within the state. 
Specifically, research (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Caiazza 2004; Cowell-Meyers and 
Langbein 2009) suggests that female representation is often positively associated with more 
generous social spending. Thus I expect that states in which a higher proportion of their 
legislature is female will tend to offer more generous Medicaid spending (H5). Additionally, this 
literature highlights the importance of examining consequences of female poverty, not just 
overall poverty on spending generosity. In consideration of the “feminization of poverty” (Pearce 
1978), alongside the understanding of healthcare often falling under the “women’s domain” 
(Knijn and Kremer 1997; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010; Shelton and John 1996) I would 
expect that state spending will be more reflective of women’s representation and poverty levels 
than men’s (H4). 
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3 DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Data 
The variables described below are selected based on the theoretical framework offered 
above. Measures themselves come from a wide range of publicly available datasets. Examples 
include the U.S. Census, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Data represents information from 2006-2016. This time period is chosen for a few reasons. First, 
collecting data across a range of years allows me to investigate the extent to which variation 
exists both between states and over time, and allows for the application of more sophisticated 
regression techniques. Second, I want a relatively recent set of data so that I can investigate 
variations within the context of recent healthcare policy changes (e.g. the Affordable Care Act). 
Third, data availability to a certain extent limits the years for which the wide variety of data used 
in this chapter, and larger dissertation, can be found. Regardless, the public availability of these 
datasets, consistency in data collection processes, and reliability of their sources offers 
confidence in the findings described below. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 2.1. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable is developed using data from the National Association of State 
Budget Officers (NASBO). Annual state budgets, available on their website, detail the total 
amount of state spending, broken down by category (healthcare, education, transportation, etc.). 
This measure of spending for Medicaid allows us to compare levels of spending within the 
context of overall social spending. Though Medicaid is a joint state-federal program, this 
measure includes only that amount allocated by the state, ensuring validity in observed variation. 
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To create my primary dependent variable, I divide this measure by state GDP, as given in 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This allows us to consider Medicaid spending 
normalized to overall state wealth, answering the question: If a state has sufficient wealth, are 
they dedicating these funds to Medicaid? 2 My secondary dependent variable takes total social 
spending, as derived from NASBO’s tabulations, as the denominator. Analysis of this variable 
points to a similar, but slightly different, question: If a state invests in social spending more 
broadly, what proportion of that is being dedicated to public healthcare in the form of Medicaid 
spending? 
 
3.1.2 Independent variables 
Independent variables, based on those used in previous literature, come from a variety of 
publicly available sources and represent the theories of welfare state development described 
above. To capture conventional functionalist controls, I include six main predictors. First, 
representing the state’s overall capacity to spend on Medicaid, are state GDP per capita (in 
millions of 2016 dollars), and Gini coefficient, which measures the level of inequality within a 
state (higher Gini coefficient indicates higher levels of inequality). In consideration of a state’s 
need for social support, I add the unemployment rate and poverty rate (the number of citizens 
living below the poverty level as a percent of total for whom poverty status is determined). As 
population controls I include percent under 18 and percent 65 and older. 
To capture conventional measures related to theories of power and politics within the 
state, I evaluate five additional variables. Voting rate reflects the percent of citizens 18 and older 
                                                 
2 Scholarship indicates the various ways in which welfare state generosity can be measured (Tropman and Gordon 
1978). While other specifications are worth exploring, in this paper I investigate only the two iterations described 
below. Future research should further consider the implications of various iterations of this outcome. 
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who voted in previous presidential election, and unionization gives the number of employed who 
are members of unions out of the total number of employed. I also include a measure of the 
extent to which state government leans toward the Democratic party. This measure is 
constructed as a five-point scale based on governor party and legislative majority for each state-
year combination.3 To capture the political and economic history of Southern exceptionalism in 
the Democratic party, I include a dummy variable of whether or not the state is in the South. In 
addition, given the importance of ability to access voting rights, I include a measure of state 
voter ID laws (higher values indicating stricter laws). 
In wanting to investigate the extent to which gendered and racialized processes shape the 
influence of these power and political variables on my outcome, I disaggregate several by both 
gender and race. This includes poverty rate4 and voter engagement.5 In order to probe the extent 
to which overall gender and race makeup of the state influence spending, I also include 
proportions of men, women, Black, and White respondents in subsequent models. Finally, I 
consider the role the gender plays through political institutions by adding a measure of the 
percent of females within the state legislature. 
 
3.2 Methods 
In this chapter I use Stata 13 (StataCorp 2013) to run a series of models on two dependent 
variables: Medicaid spending per GDP and Medicaid spending per total social spending. My 
                                                 
3 Specifically: 0 = Republican governor and legislature; 1 = independent Governor and Republican legislature or 
Republican governor and split legislature; 2 = Democratic governor and Republican legislature or independent 
governor and split legislature or Republican governor and Democratic legislature; 3 = Democratic governor and split 
legislature or independent governor and Democratic legislature; and 4 = Democratic governor and Democratic 
legislature. 
4 Normalized to the size of the subset population so that I calculate, for example, the number of White people living 
below the poverty line as a percent of the total number of White people. 
5 Due to availability of voting data, Black voter participation is unavailable for: ID, MT, SD, VT (2004); and ID, 
MT, SD (2012). These cases are excluded from the model in which this variable is tested. 
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primary tool is panel-corrected standard error regressions correcting for AR-1 correlations. This 
method is ideal for this type of data since I have outcomes that vary both over time and between 
cases (Beck and Katz 1995). In this way, this method6 corrects standard errors of coefficients for 
the lack of independence of observations within a specific state over time, which would 
otherwise violate OLS assumptions. Acknowledgement of the AR-1 correlations specifically 
highlights the tight correlation between data from time1 and time2, as opposed to say, correlations 
between time1 and time3 beyond the relationship between time1/time2 and time2/time3. It is also 
preferable to other related tests, such as fixed or random effects regressions, since the number of 
time points (11) remains small, relative to the number of cases (50).7 I use panel regression for 
both of my outcomes, Medicaid spending per GDP and Medicaid spending per total social 
spending. 
Nevertheless, I include here results from two additional tests on my primary outcome, 
spending per GDP, to explore robustness of this method. This is particularly useful given the 
limited extent to which the outcome varies over time (see descriptive results for more). The first 
set of models considers my variables averaged across all eleven timepoints and the second uses 
data from the most recent time point, 2016, with independent variables lagged one year. Both use 
standard OLS regression. 
Models are developed to reflect the theories of welfare state development given above. 
First, I consider the impact of conventional functionalist and power/political variables on my 
primary outcome, Medicaid spending per GDP. Next, I incorporate gendered and racialized 
terms drawing from the power/political perspective. This is followed by a “full” model that 
incorporates each of these paradigms, based on earlier results. After the panel regressions, I 
                                                 
6 The command in Stata 13 is “xtpcse.” 
7 Note that fixed and random effects models were run, with relatively similar results. 
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employ my secondary method, OLS, to examine the robustness of the panel models. These OLS 
regressions are conducted on the conventional and full models; additionally, parsimonious 
models are developed using step-wise elimination based on explanatory power of each 
independent variable, due to the small sample size. Third, I evaluate Medicaid spending per total 
social spending by building up models similar to my first set of analyses using panel regressions. 
 
4 FINDINGS 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
On average, Medicaid spending comprises approximately 24% of state budgets (Figure 2.1). 
Descriptive statistics for both outcomes (Table 2.1), reveal that more variation exists between 
states, than within a given state over time. Indeed, when examining overall percentage change in 
both spending per GDP and total social spending over time (Figure 2.2), the slight increase is 
unremarkable. This finding highlights the autonomous role that the states play in setting their 
own healthcare policy. Nevertheless, we can notice some outliers in their averaged rate of change 
over time (Figure 2.3). Particularly, Maine, South Dakota, and Nebraska are the only three states 
to have overall a negative rate of change in spending per GDP. In addition, Texas’s change in 
spending generosity, for both outcomes, is approximately double its next closest peer. 
Figure 2.4 displays the range of spending generosity between states. Some patterns exist 
among Southern and Midwestern states, though spending generosity does not appear to follow 
the typical political patterns that commonly distinguish starkly between Southern and 
Northeast/West coast states. Further evidence of this variation can be seen in Figure 2.5, which 
shows the range of spending per GDP averaged across the 11 years alongside overall poverty 
levels. Here we see that those states with higher levels of poverty do not necessarily have the  
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Figure 2.1 Total social spending by function (avg. 2006-2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Changes in Medicaid generosity over time 
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Figure 2.4 Medicaid spending generosity by state (avg. 2006-2016)  
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most generous Medicaid spending. For example, Maine offers the most generous spending, but 
its poverty level falls right below the median. In contrast, Texas exhibits relatively high poverty 
levels, but falls in the bottom 20% in terms of Medicaid generosity. These can both be contrasted 
with a state such as Mississippi that boasts the highest poverty level but is also ranked third in 
terms of Medicaid generosity, or New Hampshire which is ranked toward the bottom in both 
poverty and Medicaid spending. Based on functionalist perspectives of welfare state 
development, states such as Mississippi and New Hampshire represent the expected case: high 
poverty/high generosity and low poverty/low generosity, respectively (Figure 2.6). Regardless, 
scatterplots reveal somewhat of a correlation between the two (Figure 2.7). 
 
 Low generosity High generosity 
Low poverty New Hampshire  Maine 
High poverty Texas Mississippi 
 
Figure 2.6 Sample state distribution for functional typology 
 
Importantly, when poverty is disaggregated by race (Figure 2.8), we see that White poverty level 
clusters more readily with Medicaid spending generosity (r=0.551) than does Black poverty level 
(r=0.470). As an example, we look at West Virginia in Figure 2.9 and recognize that the high 
Medicaid spending generosity may be more reflective of the particularly high White poverty 
levels than the Black poverty levels, which fall close to the median. This is also illustrated in 
Figure 2.10, which compares White (y-axis) and Black (x-axis) poverty levels alongside 
Medicaid spending generosity (bubble size). West Virginia is among the highest spenders, but 
falls in the middle in terms of Black poverty levels. Compare this to Maine, which has a  
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Figure 2.7 Scatterplot of Medicaid spending per GDP and poverty levels (r=0.5027) 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Scatterplot of Medicaid spending per GDP and poverty levels by race 
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similarly generous Medicaid spending, but whose Black poverty levels are high relative to their 
White poverty levels. Additionally, Figures 2.8 and 2.10 highlight the overall higher levels of 
Black poverty in the U.S. compared to White poverty. These descriptive statistics reflect both the 
range of spending generosity across the states, as well as the extent to which this variation is 
reflective of one specific functional variable, poverty level. In addition, they highlight the 
differential relationship of this variable with our outcome based on the race of those experiencing 
poverty. 
 
Figure 2.10 Average Medicaid spending per GDP (bubble size) by White and Black poverty levels 
 
4.2 Medicaid Spending per GDP: Panel Regression 
Moving on to inferential results, Table 2.2 shows panel regression results for 
conventional functional and power/political variables on Medicaid spending per GDP. In Model 
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associations with the outcome, and in the expected directions. GDP per capita is negatively 
associated with Medicaid spending generosity, which is consistent with GDP falling in the 
denominator of our generosity variable. Having a higher percent of people under 18 is also 
negatively associated with Medicaid spending, which is surprising given that Medicaid funds are 
in part targeted toward children (Brooks et al. 2017). On the other hand, poverty levels are 
positively associated with Medicaid spending, as would be expected. 
Next, Model 2 examines power and political factors on their own. Here we see that only 
South is significant, though in the opposite direction from what we would expect. Historically, 
the South has not supported more robust social spending; thus, it is possible that this higher 
generosity is reflective of need more than political intentions. Indeed, when these variables are 
combined with the functional controls (Model 3), the significance of South disappears. All of the 
factors from Model 1 retain their significance, and in addition we see a positive association 
between having an older population and more generous spending. Of the power/political 
variables, both voter turnout and voter ID laws are significant, and in the expected directions. 
That is, where more citizens are able to and actively engage in the political process, spending is 
more generous. 
Table 2.3 takes these political/power variables and incorporates measures related to the 
gendered nature of welfare state spending. First, we see that the gender of those experiencing 
poverty does not seem to matter in overall spending generosity, as both male and female poverty 
are positively, significantly associated with our outcome.8 Nonetheless, the standardized 
coefficient for female poverty is slightly higher than that for male poverty, though not 
necessarily significantly so. I also disaggregate population by gender, and recognize a 
                                                 
8 Male and female poverty levels are tested separately due to high correlation (0.9839). When included in the same 
model, neither is significantly associated with the outcome. 
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significant, positive association between the percent of women in a state and spending 
generosity. Disaggregating voter turnout by gender does not show any significant difference 
between men and women, nor does consideration of female legislative representation. These 
findings suggest that formal political processes may not be as reflective of the gendered nature of 
the state as are informal factors related to interest group mobilization. 
Next, in Table 2.4, I disaggregate these same measures by race. Here we see that having a 
higher proportion of White residents experiencing poverty is associated with more generous 
spending, but the same is not true for Black residents in poverty.9 When I disaggregate 
population by race, to observe the extent to which presence of any specific subgroup might drive 
spending, I see no significant difference. However, the direction of the coefficient is positive for 
White population proportion and negative for Black. As above, evaluating voter turnout does not 
reveal any significant differences by race. 
In Table 2.5, I thus incorporate those variables that were significant in the gender and 
race analyses into the full model from Table 2.2. First, Model 1 examines the significant, 
positive association between female representation within the population and spending. Though 
this was significant among power/political factors, once functional variables are added to the 
model (Model 2), this significance disappears. Disaggregating poverty by race, on the other hand 
(Models 3 and 4), shows that the significant association between White poverty and spending 
generosity persists even once all other functional factors are added to the model. Additionally, 
those significant factors from Table 2.2 retain their significance here. 
                                                 
9 Including race poverty measures individually in models shows both to be significant (and positively associated), 
though White is at p<0.001 and Black is at p<0.1. I also included overall population proportion variables in these 
models and results held. 
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Together these results offer two main findings. First, the relevance of functional variables 
in shaping Medicaid policy outcomes. And second, the persistence of the role of race in 
mediating this political response to functional factors. In other words, there may be a relative 
responsiveness from the state in fulfilling the functional needs of their populace, but these efforts 
appear to be differentially targeted at citizens based on race. 
 
4.3 Medicaid spending per GDP: OLS regression 
In order to corroborate the robustness of my panel regressions, I repeat tests of 
conventional and full models using 1) data that has been averaged across the eleven time points 
and 2) data from the most recent year, 2016. Overall, findings support the results from the panel 
regressions, though results surrounding race and poverty are somewhat tempered. First, Tables 
2.6 and 2.7 present models depicting the role of conventional variables in shaping spending 
generosity. Poverty is consistently significantly associated with spending, and in the same 
direction. While full models yield limited results particularly for power/political factors, paring 
down to parsimonious models shows a positive association between spending generosity and 
having a more Democratic-leaning legislature with the averaged data (Table 2.6, Model 4). With 
the single-year data, voter ID laws are significantly negatively associated, as observed in certain 
models above. Together, these findings again emphasize the role of functional over 
power/political factors when considering conventional variables on their own. This is particularly 
emphasized by the low r2 values for these models in comparison to the functional ones. 
When female population proportion is incorporated, results vary. Table 2.8 shows the 
standardized coefficients for percent female alongside the full model, as well as a parsimonious 
model, for the averaged data. Whereas in the panel regression this effect disappears, here we see 
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it persists in both the full and parsimonious models. The coefficient for voter ID laws remains 
significant and negative here as well. In the 2016 data (Table 2.9), however, female population 
proportion loses significance, even in the parsimonious model, as it did in the panel regression. 
I incorporate poverty disaggregated by race as well in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. With the 
averaged data, White poverty levels are significantly, positively associated with the outcome, 
though this is only the case in the parsimonious model (3). Additionally, we see a marginally 
positive association with Black poverty levels as well. With the 2016 data (Table 2.11), the 
positive association between White poverty and spending is only marginal. Together these 
somewhat caution the meaningfulness of the findings from the panel regressions, that spending 
generosity be more reflective of White than Black needs. 
 
4.4 Medicaid spending per total social spending 
In order to capture another approach to studying Medicaid generosity, my next set of 
analyses consider Medicaid spending as a proportion of total social spending for each state-year 
combination. The normalization by overall social spending allows me to consider variation 
normalizing, or “controlling,” for the extent to which a state invests in social spending at large. 
Results from this analysis are again based on panel regressions and can be seen in Tables 2.12-
15. 
First, Table 2.12 shows panel regression results for conventional functional and 
power/political variables. The r2 here is similar to that for my primary dependent variable, 
however the precise variables which are significant differ. Specifically, we see that states with 
higher levels of income inequality spend more generously on Medicaid, as do states with older 
populations. Although none of the power/political factors are significant on their own, when 
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combined with functional controls we see a positive, significant association with spending 
generosity and voter turnout, as we did with the primary outcome. 
Gender is incorporated into the power/political model in Table 2.13, and results are 
markedly similar to those from analysis of the primary outcome. Disaggregating poverty by 
gender (Models 2a-b) shows no significant difference, and in fact the standardized coefficient for 
women is slightly lower than that for men this time. As before, percent female is significantly, 
positively correlated with spending generosity. Neither voter turnout nor female legislative 
representation appears to be significant here. 
When racial factors are incorporated (Table 2.14), however, results deviate from those 
discussed previously. In particular, disaggregating poverty by race (Model 2), yields opposite 
results to those seen when evaluating spending per GDP. That is, having a higher level of Black 
poverty is associated with more generous spending, while the association for White poverty is 
not significant. Similarly, having a higher proportion of Black residents in the state is also 
significantly, positively associated with the outcome. This would suggest that states that invest 
more broadly in Medicaid as a proportion of their social spending budget tend to spend more 
based on the needs and representation of their Black population. This contrasts with the finding 
from the previous panel regressions, that states with high GDP tend to spend more on Medicaid 
based on the needs of their White population. 
The robustness of these findings is evaluated in Table 2.15, which incorporates functional 
controls into the significant models from Tables 2.13-14. Whereas the significant effect of 
percent female disappeared in full models with the primary outcome, here this variable retains its 
significance (Model 1b), and in fact we fail to see a significant association with poverty and 
spending generosity. The significance of the coefficients for Gini coefficient, older population, 
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and voter turnout (though marginal) remains. When all measures are incorporated into the 
evaluation of poverty disaggregated by race (Model 2a-b), we see the minimization of the Black 
poverty effect, as it remains only marginally significant. The association between spending and 
White poverty, though negative and non-significant in the full model, is actually positively, 
significantly, associated with spending when evaluated on its own alongside Black poverty 
levels. Finally, population proportion by race does not have a significant effect once all other 
variables are taken into account (Model 3b), though percent Black is positively, significantly 
associated with the outcome on its own (Model 3a). 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examine variation in spending for Medicaid services both between states 
and over time, from 2006-2016. In applying theories of welfare state development, this study 
suggests that of conventional factors, functional arguments of state wealth and poverty are 
predominant in explaining variation (Figure 2.11). However, there is some support for power and 
political factors when gendered and racialized components are taken into consideration. 
 
Figure 2.11 Explanatory power (r2) of models 
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In particular, the distinction between the effects of poverty levels of White and Black 
residents on spending generosity is worth highlighting. Empirical studies (Brown 2013; Kail and 
Dixon 2011; Meyer 1994; Misra and Moller 1998; Moller 2002, 2002; Sander and Giertz 1986) 
indicate the failure of welfare policy to successfully address the needs of Black citizens, and 
spending for Medicaid appears to be no exception when normalized by state GDP. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.12 which shows standardized panel regression coefficients for significant 
independent variables for the full model that disaggregates poverty by race for both outcomes. 
Here we see the relatively large positive effect of White poverty levels on Medicaid spending per 
GDP, as well as the smaller, non-significant effect of Black poverty levels. A precise mechanism 
for this relationship falls outside of the scope of this project, but other scholars (HoSang, 
LaBennett, and Pulido 2012; Omi and Winant 1986) highlight the iterative relationship between 
formation of racial concepts and identities and state policy. In this way, we see evidence of 
White privilege, in that White Americans experiencing poverty are differentially-abled to 
capitalize on their political powers in shaping legislation. 
 
Figure 2.12 Significant standardized coefficients for full models, poverty disaggregated by race 
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On the other hand, when Medicaid spending is normalized by total social spending, we 
observe the inverse: states with higher levels of Black poverty spend significantly more 
generously on Medicaid, though to a lesser degree, and White poverty levels are non-
significantly, negatively associated. Importantly, this finding suggests that the “power in 
numbers” (Blalock 1967) hypothesis may be at play with this second outcome. That is, 
regardless of a state’s overall social spending, if there are higher percentages of Black residents 
experiencing poverty, more of those funds will be dedicated to Medicaid. The fact that this 
appears with this second specification highlights an important distinction between these two 
outcomes. Where a state such as Mississippi, which devotes a relatively higher portion of its 
GDP to Medicaid funds, might be more responsive to the needs of its White citizens, a state such 
as Pennsylvania, which devotes a somewhat larger portion of its total social spending budget to 
Medicaid, offers policy that is more reflective of the needs of Black citizens. 
In addition to testing variations on my outcome, this chapter also succeeded in presenting 
multiple methods for approaching studies of welfare state spending. Given the nature of the data 
(large number of states over fewer time periods), panel regression is a standard approach to 
measuring variation. However, I also tested OLS regression using both averaged data as well as 
data from a single time point. These alternative approaches are particularly fitting given the lack 
of meaningful variation over time in the dataset. Though the small number of cases in the OLS 
regressions limited the statistical power of these approaches, results did serve to reinforce the 
dominant role of functional factors in shaping Medicaid spending generosity. Nonetheless, they 
do temper the meaningfulness of the significant findings on the racialized nature of this 
spending. 
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All told, these findings highlight the importance of incorporating both gendered and 
racialized perspectives into the welfare state literature, as well as of shifting a lens onto 
healthcare as an area of public social spending. The dominant role of functional factors in 
shaping spending outcomes is particularly relevant here, reflecting results from spending for 
other social measures, such as AFDC (see e.g. Tropman and Gordon [1978]). Yet, given the 
increasingly politically charged division between those who advocate for universal healthcare 
versus employment-based insurance, it is possible that both class power and political institution 
factors may play an increasing role on healthcare funding in the future. Additionally, these 
findings reflect the wide variety of methods and variable specifications available to scholars of 
the welfare state. While testing all possible iterations of these is a useful task in exploring best 
methodological practices, this falls outside the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, this would be 
a worthwhile pursuit for future papers. 
I recognize other important steps to take as I move forward with this project. First, a lack 
of impact from more general political factors could be due in part to my operationalization of 
these ideas. As referenced in Chapter 1, party preference is an overly simple mode of measuring 
political leanings. Incorporating measures such as those by Berry et al. (2010)10 would be a 
positive next step to take. Additionally, it would be worth considering measures related more to 
the institutional construction of the state, such as the roles of judges in policy decision making. I 
also hope to incorporate the number of Medicaid recipients, as well as those eligible for these 
services. These values are difficult to find in a reliable, consistent manner for all of the years 
included in this analysis. Thus, they were not included here, but proxied for using variables 
                                                 
10 Used by political scientists, this measure of citizen and legislative ideology is developed by “using the roll call 
voting scores of state congressional delegations, the outcomes of congressional elections, the partisan division of 
state legislatures, the party of the governor, and various assumptions regarding voters and state political elites” 
(Berry et al. 1998:327). 
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related to poverty and unemployment. However, including these items, particularly if I could 
disaggregate them by race and/or gender, would be worthwhile. Finally, my operationalization of 
support for Medicaid as spending per GDP is one of many measurements for this outcome. I 
could, for example, consider spending per beneficiary. Furthermore, as Jacobs and Callaghan 
(2013) note, it may be more worthwhile to consider Medicaid expansion, or perhaps a direct 
analysis of the state of Medicaid before and after the implementation of the Affordable Care Act. 
Future studies will incorporate these other measures and test them against those discussed here. 
Overall, this study serves as a small step toward discovering why spending for healthcare 
varies between states. Medicaid spending occupies almost a quarter of states’ budget, and as 
such, is a good window into the nature of social spending at large. Additionally, changes in 
federal healthcare policy, both with the Obama and the Trump administrations, make analyses of 
this data particularly timely. As we see a desire from the public for continued investment in 
quality healthcare (Grogan and Park 2017) alongside an academic acknowledgement of 
healthcare as a universal right (Almgren 2017), understanding why some states readily support 
Medicaid spending while others are more hesitant to do so remains critical. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics (N = 550) 
Type Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
 
 
    
Outcome Medicaid spending per GDP      
     Overall 2.62 0.90 0.50 5.80  
     Between  0.83 1.37 4.56  
     Within  0.38 1.34 4.28 
 
Medicaid spending per total social 
spending     
      Overall 22.11 6.26 6.61 37.72 
      Between  5.48 8.95 34.63 
      Within  3.11 4.21 32.08 
Functional GDP per capita 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.09  
Gini coefficient 0.45 0.02 0.41 0.51  
Unemployment rate 7.30 1.87 2.80 12.70  
% under 18 23.86 1.90 19.43 31.38  
% 65 and older 13.41 1.82 6.57 19.05  
Poverty status 13.81 3.15 7.62 22.68 
Power/Political Unionization 10.73 5.39 1.60 25.20  
Voter turnout 63.64 5.50 47.30 79.20  
Democratic gov't 1.85 1.60 0 4  
Voter ID laws 0.99 1.20 0 4  
South 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Gender Poverty by gender      
   Male 12.47 2.92 6.79 20.39  
   Female 15.09 3.38 8.40 24.79  
% Female 50.64 0.76 47.62 51.79  
Voter turnout by gender      
   Male 61.52 5.54 45.20 76.70  
   Female 65.63 5.68 48.20 81.70  
% Female legislature 23.88 6.95 8.80 42.00 
Race Poverty by race      
   White 10.16 2.47 4.92 17.29  
   Black 26.90 6.77 5.69 48.00  
% White 71.87 15.28 22.37 95.63  
% Black 10.26 9.46 0.40 37.51  
Voter turnout by race      
   White 65.94 5.11 48.00 80.40  
   Black✢ 60.62 12.08 12.50 100 
            
 
 
    
✢ N = 530; see text for details.     
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Table 2.8 OLS regression of gender variables on Medicaid spending per GDP, 3-year avg.  (N = 50) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  beta   se beta   se beta   se 
               
% Female 0.409 ** (0.121) 0.364 * (0.164) 0.369 ** (0.122) 
GDP per capita 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.209 ## (0.167) 0.000 ### 0.000  
Gini coefficient 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.362 * (0.162) -0.450 ** (0.129) 
Unemployment rate 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.085 ## (0.192) 0.000 ### 0.000  
% under 18 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.411 + (0.237) -0.302 ** (0.108) 
% 65 and older 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.182 ## (0.238) 0.000 ### 0.000  
Poverty status 0.000 ## 0.000  0.694 ** (0.199) 0.802 *** (0.109) 
Unionization 0.000 ## 0.000  0.234 + (0.132) 0.195 * (0.094) 
Voter turnout 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.046 ## (0.100) 0.000 ### 0.000  
Democratic gov't 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.055 ## (0.203) 0.000 ### 0.000  
Voter ID laws 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.219 ## (0.138) -0.190 * (0.091) 
South 0.000 ## 0.000  -0.009 ## (0.116) 0.000 ### 0.000  
               
r2     0.197     0.637     0.617 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
 
Table 2.9 OLS regression of gender variables on Medicaid spending per GDP, 2016 (N = 50)   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  beta   se beta   se beta   se 
               
% Female 0.31 * (0.15) 0.20 0.00 (0.24) -0.12 0.00 (0.18) 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.40 + (0.23) -0.40 ** (0.15) 
Gini coefficient 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.27 0.00 (0.24) 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Unemployment rate 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.30 0.00 (0.23) 0.00 0.00 0.00  
% under 18 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.59 * (0.25) -0.36 ** (0.12) 
% 65 and older 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.37 0.00 (0.29) 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Poverty status 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.90 ** (0.26) 0.54 ** (0.17) 
Unionization 0.000  0.00  0.20 0.00 (0.22) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
Voter turnout 0.000 0.00 0.00  -0.08 0.00 (0.11) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
Democratic gov't 0.000 0.00 0.00  0.25 0.00 (0.18) 0.382 * (0.15) 
Voter ID laws 0.000 0.00 0.00  -0.14 0.00 (0.12) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
South 0.000 0.00 0.00  -0.10 0.00 (0.17) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
       0.00        
r2     0.080     0.557     0.495 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10   
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Table 2.10 OLS regression of race variables on Medicaid spending per GDP, 3-year avg. (N = 50)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  beta   se beta   se beta   se 
               
Poverty status 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  
   White 0.40 *** (0.10) 0.08 0.00 (0.21) 0.37 *** (0.09) 
   Black 0.22 + (0.13) 0.28 0.00 (0.19) 0.20 + (0.10) 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.31 0.00 (0.18) 0.00 * 0.00  
Gini coefficient 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 (0.14) 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Unemployment rate 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.20 0.00 (0.20) 0.31 0.00 (0.12) 
% under 18 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.28 0.00 (0.25) -0.26 0.00 (0.10) 
% 65 and older 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.07 0.00 (0.25) 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Unionization 0.000  0.00  0.07  (0.14) 0.000  0.00  
Voter turnout 0.000 0.00 0.00  -0.15 0.00 (0.19) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
Democratic gov't 0.000 0.00 0.00  0.08 0.00 (0.23) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
Voter ID laws 0.000 0.00 0.00  -0.18 0.00 (0.15) -0.19 0.00 (0.12) 
South 0.000 0.00 0.00  0.10 0.00 (0.13) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
               
r2     0.339     0.569     0.516 
Standard errors in parentheses          
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10        
 
Table 2.11 OLS regression of race variables on Medicaid spending per GDP, 2016 (N = 50)   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  beta   se beta   se beta   se 
               
Poverty status 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  
   White 0.54 *** (0.14) 0.14 0.00 (0.20) 0.28 + (0.15) 
   Black 0.09 0.00 (0.14) 0.26 0.00 (0.18) 0.15 0.00 (0.12) 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.58 0.00 (0.30) -0.43 + (0.20) 
Gini coefficient 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.10 0.00 (0.23) 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Unemployment rate 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.05 0.00 (0.25) 0.00 0.00 0.00  
% under 18 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.41 0.00 (0.28) -0.22 0.00 (0.12) 
% 65 and older 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.28 + (0.36) 0.00 * 0.00  
Unionization 0.000  0.00  0.03  (0.23) 0.000  0.00  
Voter turnout 0.000 0.00 0.00  -0.16 0.00 (0.17) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
Democratic gov't 0.000 0.00 0.00  0.30 + (0.18) 0.35 * (0.13) 
Voter ID laws 0.000 0.00 0.00  -0.11 0.00 (0.15) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
South 0.000 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 (0.17) 0.000 0.00 0.00  
               
r2     0.273     0.488     0.441 
Standard errors in parentheses          
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10        
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CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND NEED FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The United States has long been considered an outlier in its extent and quality of welfare 
services; legislation offering support for reproductive healthcare is no exception. At the same 
time that we see an increasing need for publicly funded access to these services (Frost, 
Frohwirth, and Zolna 2016; Frost, Zolna, and Frohwirth 2013), reports indicate concern over 
recent or anticipated changes in the landscape of reproductive healthcare (Gold and Hasstedt 
2017; Kreitzer and Smith 2016). Notably, these changes affect women of color and those 
experiencing poverty particularly poorly (Hasstedt 2017; Howell and Starrs 2017). With the 
exception of a small handful of federal regulations, the protection of women’s rights to 
healthcare remains relegated to the states. As such, we see a patchwork of provisions developed 
haphazardly within the varying cultural and historical contexts of each state. In this chapter, I 
ask: What state-level factors are associated with variation in spending for reproductive healthcare 
services? And how do historical policies, along with women’s needs for these services, impact 
levels of spending? 
To answer these questions, given an understanding of the role that the state as an 
institution plays in shaping collective notions of gender (MacKinnon 1989; Martin 2004) and 
race (Omi and Winant 1986), I draw from literature on the gendered and racialized welfare state. 
Building off of work by Marshall (1950) and Rawls (1971), Almgren (2017) highlights the 
extent to which healthcare can and should be a right of citizenship in a wealthy democracy. 
Similarly, Daniels (1993) and Orloff (1993) emphasize the right to bodily autonomy as a 
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“primary foundation of liberal citizenship” (Daniels 1993:5). The argument for including 
spending on reproductive health in discussions of social rights is strengthened when we consider 
the positive impacts experienced by women, and society as a whole, when these services are 
more readily accessible (Frost et al. 2014; Frost, Finer, and Tapales 2008; Kavanaugh and 
Andersen 2016). 
Yet path-dependent histories of gender and racial injustices surrounding reproductive 
policy complicate this right. In particular, much scholarship is dedicated to documenting the use 
of family planning policy as a method of state control over women’s bodies, particularly for 
women of color and women experiencing poverty (Correa and Reichmann 1994; Farrell, 
Dawkins, and Oliver 1983; Greil et al. 2011; Gurr 2011; King and Meyer 1997; Roberts 2014). 
More broadly, other scholars note the two-tiered nature of U.S. social welfare in general (Gordon 
1994; Quadagno 1996; Sainsbury 1996; Schram, Soss, and Fording 2003) that disproportionately 
stigmatizes women and people of color. 
This chapter thus serves as an empirical examination of the impact that the racialized and 
gendered welfare state has on shaping reproductive policy outcomes. Specifically, I use OLS 
regression to predict generosity of spending for family planning services (contraceptives, 
sterilization, and associated services) based on a variety of state level factors at three recent time-
points: 2006, 2010, and 2015. Data is gathered from publicly available sources, such as reports 
from the Guttmacher Institute, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
This chapter contributes to my larger investigation into gendered and racialized policy 
mechanisms in two ways. First, in conducting an empirical analysis of variation in spending for 
reproductive services, I am applying traditional theories of welfare state development to an 
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under-studied form of social spending in the welfare state literature, spending for family 
planning services. Second, I am advocating for the incorporation of measures related to the 
racialized and gendered nature of these policies. 
 
2 THEORY 
Scholarship and reports (Almeling 2015; Center for Reproductive Rights 2011) make a 
compelling case for treating reproductive healthcare as a social right of citizenship. In this way, 
the theories of welfare state development addressed previously in Chapters 1 and 2 serve as a 
useful jumping off point in examining spending for family planning services. Furthermore, given 
the inherently gendered aspect of family planning services, alongside a particularly racialized 
history even within the context of the racialized U.S. welfare state, attention to race and gender 
makeup of both the population and those in need is particularly important. A summary of the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 1 can again be seen in Table 1.1. 
As described in previous chapters, conventional theories of welfare state development 
can be classified as falling into two categories. First, functionalists argue that state spending is 
based upon both the state’s need for publicly-funded services as well as its capacity to support 
this need (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975). We thus expect that states with higher wealth would 
spend more generously, as would states with higher levels of poverty and unemployment, and 
similarly higher levels of income inequality (H1). Other functionalist variables, such as 
population age, primarily serve as controls against which more theoretically-motivated variables 
are tested. 
Next, scholars identify a series of variables that speak to the political institution of the 
state (Amenta 1998) as well as citizens’ abilities to capitalize on their political rights (Korpi 
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1989; Misra 2002; Quadagno 1987; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). These include factors such as 
levels of unionization, voter engagement and party identification, as well as specific policies 
related to voting access and prior legislative actions (Quadagno 2004; Skocpol and Amenta 
1986). In incorporating these conventional aspects of the welfare state literature into my analysis, 
I expect that states with more liberal policy and policy-makers (H3), as well as better access to 
political rights via strong unions and lack of voter ID laws (H2) will spend more generously for 
family planning services. 
 
2.1 Gender, Race, and Family Planning Services 
Scholars of the gendered welfare state point to the importance of studying funding 
allocations of particular relevance to women (Bacchi 1999; Lewis 1992; O’Connor, Orloff, and 
Shaver 1999; Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1996) in order to more fully capture the extent to which a 
state supports its populace. Studying spending generosity for reproductive healthcare services 
specifically, I am able to evaluate policies targeted to woman-as-citizen, rather than woman-as-
mother. Additionally, these scholars also highlight the importance of considering predictive 
factors that take into account women’s experiences rather than considering purportedly gender-
neutral variables, such as overall poverty level. I thus incorporate a series of additional 
independent variables in this analysis related to the theoretical frames described above. First, 
given the higher rates at which women experience poverty within the U.S. (Pearce 1978) as well 
as the inherently gendered nature of my outcome, looking at overall poverty levels may not tell 
the full story of the extent to which policy is reflective of women’s needs. I thus anticipate that 
high female poverty levels will be associated with more generous spending, moreso than male 
poverty levels (H4). Similarly, I include a factor related specifically to need for publicly funded 
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contraceptives among women. Additionally, the extent to which class power, in particular voter 
participation and female representation, impact such a gendered outcome may be mediated in 
part by gender. Under the expectation that citizens are voting in self-interest, I would expect that 
high female voter participation as well as a larger population proportion of women would be 
positively correlated with family planning spending (H4). 
Second, feminist scholars of the welfare state also emphasize the role of female 
representation within the legislature in advocating for and passing legislation related to women’s 
fights for equality (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Paxton, Green, and Hughes 2008; Poggione 
2004). Thus, I expect that states legislatures that have a higher proportion of women will also 
spend more generously on publicly funded family planning services (H5). 
Just as welfare spending at large carries a racialized history, so too do policies aimed at 
family planning services. Scholars have detailed the history of family planning policies used as a 
means for controlling the reproductive outcomes for women of color (Correa and Reichmann 
1994; Farrell et al. 1983; Greil et al. 2011; Gurr 2011; King and Meyer 1997; Roberts 2014). 
Simultaneously, we recognize that those who are most underserved by current family planning 
policy tend to be poorer women and women of color (Center for Reproductive Rights 2011). 
This reflects the “too much/too little” dilemma espoused by Joffe (2018), and Joffe and Reich 
(2014) or the “contraceptive paradox” described by Mann (2018). Thus, a question emerges 
about the extent to which current funding policies may or may not support the needs of women 
of color equally to white women’s needs. From a historical perspective, we might expect higher 
levels of public funding for family planning services in areas with relatively higher poverty and 
need among Black women; yet given current descriptive reports, we indeed anticipate seeing the 
opposite. This is further suggested by scholars of the racialized welfare state who highlight the 
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role that racial representation may play in shaping spending outcomes. In particular, scholars 
offer the “threat hypothesis” (Key 1949) which suggests that the presence of people of color 
within a state will cause fear among White policy-makers who will in turn produce policies that 
fail to help, or explicitly harm, people of color.1 Similarly, racialized conflict theory (Brown 
2013) and critical race theory (Delgado and Stefancic 2012) indicate the extent to which state 
policy is shaped by, and to protect, those in power or in the majority, i.e. White Americans. 
Thus, in considering the percent of a state’s population that is Black and White, alongside female 
poverty levels and need disaggregated by race, we anticipate that state spending will be more 
reflective of White women’s needs and representation than those of Black women (H6). 
 
3 DATA AND METHODS 
The variables selected for this chapter are based on those used in previous literature, as 
detailed above. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be seen in Table 3.1. 
 
3.1 Data 
Data for this chapter come from a variety of publicly available sources, including the 
U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data for spending on family 
planning comes from public reports published by the Guttmacher Institute. The Guttmacher 
Institute is a private organization that collects data on, and advocates for, sexual and reproductive 
health. Data for this project come from the results of the 2006, 2010, and 2015 surveys of public 
expenditures (Hasstedt, Sonfield, and Benson Gold 2017; Sonfield, Alrich, and Gold 2008; 
                                                 
1 This is contrasted with the “power in numbers” hypothesis, which highlights the positive role that representation 
can play in making change. Debates surrounding these opposing theories suggest the extent to which both may be at 
play, indeed in non-linear fashions (Reese, Ramirez, and Estrada-Correa 2013). Given the data available for this 
project, that type of nuanced analysis falls outside the scope of this project, but is recommended for future research. 
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Sonfield and Gold 2012). Conducted at seven time points since 1980, this survey gathers state-
level data from a series of healthcare providers regarding expenditures, by funding source, for 
contraceptives, sterilization, abortion, and related services. Data collection itself took place 
across the span of approximately 6 months to one year (depending on the year) via email and 
telephone. Surveys were administered to “to the health, social services and Medicaid agencies in 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as to … Title X grantees that were identified 
by the federal Office of Population Affairs” (Hasstedt et al. 2017). Missing data were filled in 
using reports from previous years, as well as Title X grant information from the Office of 
Population Affairs and Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) expenditures 
from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). More detailed data collection 
methodology can be found in the reports themselves. These specific years were chosen for their 
recency and availability of relevant data; future projects would do well to examine additional 
years as well. The analytic sample for analysis is comprised of data from all fifty states but 
excludes D.C.2 (N = 50). 
Although valid, reliable data on reproductive services is notably difficult to collect, the 
nature and source of the data used for this analysis circumvent some of these difficulties. 
Specifically, aggregated public spending data is of a less sensitive nature than individual-level 
data indicating use of family planning services and is thus less likely to be subject to certain 
report biases. Additionally, since data come from service providers, rather than individual self-
reports, the threat of social desirability is again minimized. One major concern regarding 
reliability of these reports is inconsistent response rates between organizations, states, and years. 
To address this, authors used additional data from the Office of Population Affairs and the 
                                                 
2 D.C. is excluded from the analytic sample in part due to data availability for other measures, and in part because of 
its exceptional political status (e.g. failing to have its own legislative or executive body outside of Congress). 
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Center for Medicare and Medicaid services as appropriate. Authors caution that “the report[s] 
should be seen as providing an approximation, rather than a precise accounting, of dollars spent” 
(Hasstedt et al. 2017). Nevertheless, this data “represent[s] the most complete summary of public 
funding available” (Hasstedt et al. 2017) and thus application of these results are appropriate 
here. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
This chapter considers two conceptualizations of my outcome, family planning spending 
generosity. The first dependent variable is a measure of spending for family planning services as 
a proportion of state gross domestic product (GDP) for the same year. The second considers 
family planning spending per total social spending in order to target a slightly different 
perspective on spending generosity. As defined by the Guttmacher Institute, family planning 
“refer[s] to the package of direct patient care services provided through family planning 
programs to clients receiving reversible contraceptives or sterilization services” (Sonfield and 
Gold 2012). These include client counseling and education, contraceptive drugs and devices, 
related diagnostic tests and treatment after diagnosis. Surveys prior to 2015 distinguish between 
contraceptive and sterilization expenditures, but the survey in 2015 did not. Thus, here I keep 
these types of expenditures combined, yet notably they represent different services at both an 
individual and societal levels, particularly when considering disproportional sterilization rates 
among women of color (Borrero et al. 2014; Ramsden 2003). Disentangling these two using 
earlier data would provide nuance to this exploration in future research. In addition, notably, 
these values do not include funding for abortion services.3 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 4 for analysis of policy for publicly funded abortions. 
  101 
In analyses of state spending and welfare development, a variety of outcomes have been 
considered, depending on the goal of the analysis (Olaskoaga-Larrauri, Aláez-Aller, and Díaz-
de-Basurto 2010). Here I have chosen to primarily normalize spending by state wealth in order to 
speak to the extent of welfare development as it refers to family planning spending, and to be 
consistent with other scholars. From Bolzendahl (2009), “Placing GDP in the denominator 
reflects these priorities in relative terms, recognizing that states may vary in terms of overall 
economic productivity and thus standardizes spending within a particular nation [or state].” 
Nevertheless, I also normalize family planning spending by overall total social spending in order 
to 1) conduct a robustness check on my primary outcome and 2) investigate the extent to which 
states that invest in social spending at large are particularly responsive of the need for family 
planning services. 
Additionally, given the vast extent to which medical care is privatized in the U.S., it is 
worth noting the availability of these services through private avenues (such as employee-based 
insurance). However, its exclusion from measures used here is appropriate. In considering extent 
of welfare state development, as represented by spending for family planning, I am concerned 
only with those goods provided by the state, to the extent that they confer rights of citizenship 
(Almgren 2017). An analysis of total (public and private) spending for family planning would 
speak more to considerations of use and coverage of these services by and for citizens. Although 
this is an equally worthwhile endeavor, it remains outside the scope of this paper. 
 
3.1.2 Independent variables 
Independent variables used in this analysis are based on those from previous studies of 
welfare spending in the U.S., with special attention to those that take race and gender into 
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account (e.g. Kail and Dixon [2011], Misra and Moller [1998], and Moller [2002]). In annual 
models, independent variables are lagged one year, except where otherwise noted; averaged 
models evaluate data from 2006, 2010, and 2015, averaged together. 
The first set of independent variables speaks to a functionalist perspective of welfare state 
development, considering states’ needs for these services alongside their ability to provide for 
them. To account for a states’ abilities to provide funding for these services, I include a control 
for state GDP per capita as well as Gini coefficient. GDP per capita is in millions of dollars, and 
is adjusted for inflation in the averaged models. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 
higher values indicating higher levels of inequality. To capture need within a state, I include a 
series of poverty and unemployment levels alongside controls for population age. 
Next, I include several variables from the power and political perspectives in order to 
capture the extent to which these functional factors are tempered by citizen engagement and 
access to political rights. First is a measure of the extent of unionization that exists within the 
state, that is, the percent of those who are employed that are members of unions. I also include 
percent of citizens who voted in the previous presidential election, disaggregated by gender and 
race. Second, to identify the dominant political party within the state I develop a five-point scale 
measuring the extent to which state government is Democratic vs. Republican. This measure 
incorporates both legislative majority and gubernatorial party affiliation.4 Third, I add a scale 
indicating a state’s lack of strict voter ID laws, where lower values reflect stricter laws. This 
categorization is developed by the National Council of State legislatures and reflects whether a 
                                                 
4 Specifically: 0 = Republican governor and legislature; 1 = independent Governor and Republican legislature or 
Republican governor and split legislature; 2 = Democratic governor and Republican legislature or independent 
governor and split legislature or Republican governor and Democratic legislature; 3 = Democratic governor and split 
legislature or independent governor and Democratic legislature; and 4 = Democratic governor and Democratic 
legislature. 
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state has adopted policy requiring ID or photo ID, as well as the strictness of the policy (e.g. 
whether citizens can submit a provisional ballot).5 Fourth, to incorporate policy legacies, I 
include a control to indicate whether abortion was legal (in either some or all circumstances) in a 
state prior to the passage of Roe v. Wade in 1973. I also include the variable South indicating 
whether a state is southern by U.S. Census definitions given the historical impact of southern 
Democrats in steering welfare state legislation. 
I then incorporate notions of the gendered and racialized welfare state into these 
power/political variables with the disaggregation of specific factors by gender and race. This 
includes female poverty level, an indicator which I disaggregate by race6 and controls for the 
percent of women, White residents, and Black residents within a state, as derived from Census 
counts. I similarly disaggregate voter turnout by gender and race7. In subsequent models, I also 
include the number of women in need of publicly funded contraceptive services as a percent of 
the total number of women in need of contraceptives. These measures8 are collected from 
Guttmacher reports based on statistics of age, gender, and income from the U.S. Census Bureau 
alongside data on sexual activity and fecundity from the National Survey of Family Growth 
(NSFG). Need for publicly funded contraceptives is then converted into a proportion normalized 
by overall need for contraceptives, also from the Guttmacher Institute. This measure notably 
excludes need for other services that fall under the umbrella of family planning services, but it 
still serves as a good proxy for the operationalization of this concept. This measure is also later 
disaggregated by race (non-Hispanic White and non-Hispanic Black). Finally, given the role of 
                                                 
5 Specifically: 0 = none; 1 = non-strict non-photo; 2 = non-strict photo; 3 = strict non-photo; 4 = strict photo. 
6 The variables are constructed by subgroup, so that the denominator of the Black women in poverty variable is the 
total number of Black women for whom poverty level is determined, rather than the overall state population.  
7 Data for Black voting rates is unavailable for the following state-year combinations: ID, MT, SD, VT (2006); ID, 
MT, SD (2012). These states are excluded from analyses with this variable. 
8 For analysis of 2006 and 2010 data, this term is not lagged, due to data availability. 
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female legislatures in advocating for policies aimed at supporting women (Bolzendahl and 
Brooks 2007; Caiazza 2004; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009), I add a variable for the percent 
of the state legislature that is female.  
 
3.2 Methods 
Analyses for this project are based on a series of OLS regressions, with standard errors 
clustered at the state level. The Guttmacher Institute offers this survey at multiple time points, 
but they caution comparison of changes from one time point to the next, given the limitations of 
the survey design and the difficulty of obtaining data on family planning services. Thus, even 
though we cannot necessary draw direct conclusions from a comparison of spending between 
years, we can observe a snapshot of the factors related to spending at these single points in time. 
I therefore proceed with OLS regression, rather than more sophisticated techniques such as panel 
regression or pooled cross-sectional time series. Previous use of OLS for similar analyses at 
single time points by other scholars (Moller 2002) supports this methodological choice. 
The analyses themselves take on two forms. First, I evaluate spending variation 
normalized by state GDP. This is initially done through a series of OLS regressions using data 
that has been averaged across the three time points (2006, 2010, and 2015). Models are 
constructed to represent: 1) conventional welfare state variables; 2) the role of gender in 
power/political factors; and 3) the role of race in the same. I also combine factors from each of 
these models to create both “full” and “parsimonious” models.9 Second, I evaluate the full and 
                                                 
9 Due to the limited sample size, combining all factors into a single regression tends to over-fit the data, and thus the 
parsimonious model is constructed through single elimination of those factors whose contribution to the overall 
sums of squares is limited. 
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parsimonious models using data at each individual time-point, in order to evaluate the robustness 
of my averaging. 
The second phase of the analysis considers my alternate outcome, family planning 
spending normalized by total social spending. These again utilize data averaged across the time-
points, and I repeat the first set of averaged regressions above. In comparing results from these 
two outcomes, I can provide additional robustness and nuance to evaluations of spending 
variation. 
All analyses are conducted using Stata 13 (StataCorp 2013). 
 
4 FINDINGS 
4.1 Descriptive results 
From reports (Hasstedt et al. 2017; Sonfield et al. 2008; Sonfield and Gold 2012), we 
recognize that Medicaid comprises the majority (74%) of funding sources for family planning 
spending by the state (Figure 3.1). Though state-only sources make up a relatively smaller slice,  
 
Figure 3.1 Sources of family planning funds, 3-year avg. 
Medicaid
74%
State-only
13%
Other 
federal
3%
Title X
10%
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we are still able to observe meaningful variation by state in terms of overall family planning 
spending per GDP and per total social spending (Figure 3.2). Two observations are notable here. 
First, there are certain similarities between the two operationalizations of the outcome that stand 
out; for example, California, Mississippi, and Kentucky consistently spend generously in both. 
Texas, on the other hand, would appear to spend more generously when family planning 
spending is normalized by total social spending rather than state GDP. This suggests that while 
Texas’ large GDP may not be being invested into family planning services specifically, when it 
is being invested into social services, a more generous amount of money is going toward family 
planning funds. Second, regardless of the outcome’s operationalization, Kentucky serves as an 
extreme outlier among the states. This may in part be due to Kentucky’s expanded Medicaid 
eligibility (Sommers et al. 2015), but further research should investigate in more nuance the 
processes involved here, particularly given the state’s traditionally more conservative status. 
The variation in family planning spending generosity can also be seen in Figure 3.3, in 
which states are ranked by the outcome, alongside overall need for publicly funded 
contraceptives. Here we again see Kentucky as an outlier, but necessarily so, given the high 
levels of need within the state. Yet several other states maintain similar levels of need without 
the proportionally high levels of funding. On the other hand, we also see states such as 
Washington, which falls on the higher end of spending generosity but boasts one of the lowest 
levels of need. In addition to this variation in spending, this figure also conveys the extent to 
which need as a whole is relatively high across all fifty states, with more than half of states 
boasting need for publicly funded contraceptives among more than 50% of their child-bearing 
populations. 
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Figure 3.2 Family planning spending generosity by state 
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Next, considering the racialized history of social spending at large as well as policy 
around family planning services in particular, I break need down by race. The scatterplot in 
Figure 3.4 reflects this distinction. In addition to recognizing the disproportionately high need for  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Scatterplot of need by race and family planning spending generosity 
 
publicly funded contraceptives among Black women, we can also recognize the extent to which 
each correlates with our outcome. Notably, need for White women is significantly correlated 
with the outcome while need for Black women is not. When median-centered need is 
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Finally, though hesitations should be made before comparing variation between the three 
time points (see above), Figure 3.6 displays family planning spending per GDP and per total 
social spending, with separate y-axes, for 2006, 2010, 2015. Here we see a slight drop in 2015, 
though all measures fall within one standard deviation of each other. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Comparison of average spending generosity averaged over time 
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The parsimonious model (4), however, shows that states with stricter voter ID laws tend to have 
less generous family planning spending. Regardless, the higher r2 for the functional factors 
(0.346) over the power/political factors (0.183) reinforces the suggested role of functional 
variables in shaping spending outcomes. 
Moving on to Table 3.3, I incorporate gendered perspectives of the welfare state into the 
power/political variables. First, disaggregating poverty by gender shows that both male (Model 
2a) and female (Model 2b) poverty levels are associated with greater spending generosity.10 
Though we would expect that female poverty level might be more important in driving spending 
generosity than male poverty, given the targeting of family planning services at women, this is 
not the case; indeed, the standardized coefficient for male poverty level is slightly higher (though 
not necessarily significantly so). Second, I account for the relationship between need for 
publicly-funded contraceptives and spending generosity in Model 3. Similar to Model 2b, need is 
positively, significantly associated with spending generosity. Percent female, however, is not 
significantly associated, nor is voter turnout by gender. This second finding is not particularly 
surprising, given that overall voter turnout was not significant (Model 1). For my final gendered 
variable, I include female legislative representation. This is significant and positively associated, 
though marginally so. Pairing down Model 3 to the more parsimonious model (7) reveals the 
positive, significant association between having a more democratic legislature and being a 
Southern state with spending generosity, as well as the persistent effect of need on spending 
generosity. 
Next, I incorporate racialized welfare state terms into the power/political model (Table 
3.4). Here we see that when both female poverty (Model 2) and need (Model 3) are 
                                                 
10 Male and female poverty are included in separate regressions due to collinearity (r = 0.9835). 
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disaggregated by race, only the White terms for both factors are significantly associated with the 
outcome. This suggests that states with higher proportions of White women in poverty, or more 
specifically in in need of these services, have more generous funding for such. Conversely, states 
are not equally responsive to levels of Black female poverty and need. Although disaggregating 
population by race (Model 4) shows no significant difference between Black and White 
population proportions, we see a marginally negative effect of White voter turnout (Model 5) on 
spending generosity. This effect disappears, however, in the parsimonious model (6) that 
contains both need and voter turnout disaggregated by race. Here, White women’s needs as well 
as having liberal pre-Roe abortion policy are positively, significantly associated with the 
outcome. 
Finally, Table 3.5 shows the full (Models 1b and 2b) and parsimonious (Models 1c and 
2c) models that incorporate these gendered and racialized factors alongside conventional 
measures of welfare state development. In particular, I highlight the persistent difference 
between White and Black women’s needs and spending generosity. In Models 1a and 2a we see 
that White women’s poverty and need are both positively associated with our outcome, while 
those for Black women remain insignificant. This relationship persists in both the full and 
parsimonious models; indeed, in Model 2c we see a marginally negative association between 
Black female need and the outcome, reinforcing this distinction between White and Black 
women’s needs in shaping policy for family planning spending. 
Of the more conventional welfare state measures in these final tables, only one is 
significantly associated with the outcome in the full models (unemployment, positively so), likely 
due to these models being over-fitted. In the parsimonious model with need (Model 2c), 
however, we see that unemployment remains positively associated with spending generosity, 
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reflecting that states with higher levels of unemployment spend more generously on family 
planning services. Of marginal significance is the South term (positive), reflecting the findings in 
Model 7 of Table 3.3. 
 
4.3 Regression Results: Annual Spending per GDP 
In order to corroborate these findings, we next consider the full model at each of the three 
individual time points whose data were averaged for the previous set of analyses. Additionally, 
we can highlight potential shifts in findings over time. Beginning with data from 2006 (Table 
3.6), we see results that strongly reflect those from the averaged models. Both White female 
poverty and need are significantly positively associated with spending generosity throughout the 
models, with Black need negatively associated with such in the final Model (2c). Interestingly, 
we see more significance in conventional welfare state variables in the full model evaluating 
need by race (Model 2b) than in the previous regressions, including a positive association 
between Gini coefficient and spending generosity and a marginally positive association between 
voter turnout and spending. The significant associations between unemployment (positive) and 
voter ID laws (negative) persist in the parsimonious model (2c). 
In 2010 (Table 3.7), we again see similar results, particularly for the significant, positive 
association between White female poverty and need and my outcome. Here we also see a 
negative association between GDP per capita and spending generosity in one of the full models 
(2b), as well as the persistent relationship between unemployment and generosity (Models 1c, 2b, 
and 2c). In comparing r2 values, those for regressions based on the 2010 data are markedly larger 
for almost every model, suggesting that these particular variables do a better job of describing 
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variation in spending generosity in 2010 than in 2006. While this is notable, further research 
would need to be conducted in order to determine the precise reasons for this shift. 
Finally, data from 2015 (Table 3.8) reflect a somewhat similar pattern of correlates as the 
other two years, yet results appear to be somewhat tempered. White female poverty is only 
marginally associated with spending generosity in the first two models, and indeed becomes 
insignificant in explaining such in the parsimonious model. Similarly, White need is significant 
in Models 2a and 3c. Importantly, although it loses its significance in the full model (2b), here 
we see a negative association between Black need and spending, perhaps reflecting similar 
processes. This negative relationship persists, though diminishes, in the parsimonious model. 
Furthermore, the r2 values for these models are lower than either of the other two, once again 
suggesting a limitation to the extent to which these variables successfully explain variation in our 
outcome.  
 
4.4 Regression Results: Family Planning Spending per Total Social Spending 
Turning to my second, outcome, Tables 3.9-12 show results for variables regressed on 
family planning spending as a percent of total social spending for the state.11 With these tests, I 
am able to evaluate the robustness of the findings from the averaged spending per GDP models, 
as well as consider the extent to which results might differ based on my operationalization of 
spending “generosity.” Overall, results do differ somewhat from those in Tables 3.2-5. 
In Table 3.9 we see the conventional welfare state measures regressed on my second 
outcome. Similar to the first set of models, the functional factors seem to play a larger role in 
shaping spending generosity than do the conventional power and political factors. This is 
                                                 
11 Data averaged across the three time points. 
  116 
highlighted by the lack of significance among this second set of factors, as well as the difference 
in r2 between the two models (1 and 2). When combined (Model 3), only the Gini coefficient is 
significantly, positively associated, and only marginally so. In the parsimonious model (Model 
4), however, we see that GDP per capita is negatively associated with spending generosity, as is 
having an older population. Where the direction of the Gini coefficient might suggest the active 
response of state policy to alleviating inequality within the state, the negative association 
between GDP per capita and spending generosity suggests the opposite, that wealthier states 
invest less readily in family planning spending. The negative association between older 
populations and spending generosity may be related to the extent to which family planning 
policy is targeted at women of child-bearing age. Importantly, poverty, which was so persistently 
significant in those models of spending per GDP, fails to reach significance in all of these tests. 
Next, Table 3.10 incorporates gendered aspects of the welfare state into the 
power/political factors. Not unexpectedly, given the results from the previous table, few of these 
factors are found to be significant. Indeed, the only gendered term that is, female poverty, is only 
marginally significant, as is the male poverty measure. In creating a parsimonious model (Model 
7), we are able to see positive significant association between the outcome and the coefficient for 
need (p<0.1); additionally South and pre-Roe abortion legislation remain in the model, though 
neither are significant. 
Moving on to Table 3.11, we have measures related to the racialized welfare state. 
Similar to the previous set of models, nothing is significant here. Most notably, disaggregating 
poverty and need by race does not yield significance for either factor, in opposition to the 
findings when spending is normalized by GDP. Nevertheless, I combine gendered and racialized 
factors to create full models in Table 3.12. Here the persistent positive significance of the Gini 
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coefficient in predicting spending variation remains evident in both full and parsimonious 
models. Given the lack of significance of the racialized poverty and need measures in the 
previous set of models, it is not surprising to see inconsistent significance here. Nevertheless, 
effects, when marginally significant in the parsimonious models (1c and 2c) are in the expected 
direction, with White female poverty/need positively associated with the outcome. 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter seeks to narrow the scope from the previous one, in that here we focus on 
public spending solely for family planning services. In doing so, I am able to evaluate the extent 
to which conventional measures of welfare state development apply to this narrower, particularly 
gendered, form of social support. In addition, I consider how the racialized nature of 
reproductive healthcare policy, both historically and currently, may shape recent funding 
decisions. 
The findings above offer several implications for understanding observed variation in 
spending for reproductive healthcare in the U.S. First, descriptively, we see that the majority of 
public spending comes from Medicaid funds. In an era where questions of the continued need for 
Medicaid arise in the public and political spheres, this data from the Guttmacher Institute 
highlights the ongoing need for these funds, particularly for women. Additionally, we are able to 
identify specific states that either exemplify or counter our expectations around the relationships 
between social spending and need. Where a state such as Kentucky touts the most generous 
amounts of funding alongside relatively high levels of need, North Dakota represents the 
opposite. More detailed case analysis, particularly for Kentucky, whose spending generosity 
towers over that of its peers, would be helpful in further understanding these differences. 
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Importantly, these descriptive statistics also highlight the real need for publicly-funded 
contraceptives among the population, and particularly for Black women. 
Second, we are able to further evaluate the hypotheses posited in Chapter 1. In 
consideration of the role of functional factors in shaping spending generosity for family planning 
services, we see relatively strong support. This comes in the form of the positive association 
between poverty level, alongside unemployment, and family planning spending (per GDP) as 
well as between having high income inequality and spending (per total social spending). In 
evaluation of the conventional measures of power resource and political institutionalism, we find 
limited support for factors such as party identification, level of unionization, or pre-Roe abortion 
law. 
Nevertheless, disaggregating poverty and need by race yields fruitful results when 
considering the extent to which class power in shaping policy decisions is tempered by the race 
of those in need. In particular, I note the extent to which White female poverty and need are 
positively associated with our outcome (spending per GDP), while Black female poverty and 
need either show no significant association or are negatively associated with such. This finding is 
illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
Given the history of racially discriminatory patters of social spending in the U.S. (Gordon 
1994; Quadagno 2004; Schram et al. 2003), these findings offer empirical support of this 
problematic legacy. In addition, they offer support for the hypothesis which describes the role of 
the state in perpetuating inequality rather than alleviating it (Delgado and Stefancic 2012; Meyer 
1994). Still, where other research emphasizes the coercive use of family planning policy that 
disproportionately targets women of color (Correa and Reichmann 1994; Farrell et al. 1983; 
Greil et al. 2011; Gurr 2011; King and Meyer 1997), these findings suggest that Black women’s 
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access to these services remains a tangible barrier. Future research would do well to better 
disentangle this tension. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Standardized coefficients for female poverty and need disaggregated by race regressed on spending per 
GDP (parsimonious model) 
 
Finally, in consideration of the gendered nature of the outcome, I predicted that state 
spending would be reflective of the needs of women over men, as well as the role of female 
legislatures in shaping such policies. Findings here are mixed. Female poverty and need are 
significantly, positively associated with the primary outcome, but so are male poverty levels. 
Additionally, female poverty and need seem to have little to no effect when spending is 
normalized by total social spending. In consideration of the gender makeup of the state 
legislature, female legislative representation is only marginally significant in one model, and 
indeed we see a negative association with our outcome. This finding would appear to counter the 
hypothesis that female legislative representation matters in passing more robust “female-
friendly” welfare policy (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Paxton et al. 2008; Poggione 2004). It 
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would be worth further investigation to see the extent to which this holds for other forms of 
reproductive policy, rather than social spending, given that female legislatures themselves likely 
have access to more robust employment-based insurance coverage for such services. 
Nevertheless, overall, these findings support the incorporation of gendered and racialized 
measures when investigating welfare state spending at large, and reproductive healthcare 
spending in particular. 
Additionally, this chapter makes use of two different outcomes in evaluating correlates 
for family planning spending generosity. When regressing on spending per GDP, we see the 
extent to which racialized factors seem to play a larger role in shaping spending decisions, yet 
this finding does not hold up when normalizing by total social spending. This suggests that 
among states that are investing their overall social spending in family planning services, there 
appears to be less of a bias toward White women’s needs over Black women’s. The same cannot 
be said for states that are investing large proportions of their overall wealth into these same 
services. Further research might consider additional operationalizations of the outcome, such as 
spending per number of women in need. 
This project offers novel analysis on a rich dataset, but some limitations and further 
directions are worth noting. First, this chapter only examines specific family planning services, 
namely contraception and sterilization. This notably excludes funding for abortions. Given the 
history and politicization of abortion in the U.S., further investigation of factors related to 
spending for abortion, and comparison with spending for other reproductive healthcare services, 
would be a logical next step. I pursue this question further in Chapter 4. 
Second, this project only considers funding from three time points. Although data 
availability is limited, there are relatively comparable measures for four other points in time 
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going back to 1980. Examination of what drives changes in funding for a specific state over time 
might help to reveal the extent to which policy legacies continue to play a part in current funding 
decisions. Additionally, delving further into the difference in r2 values between each of the 
years’ data, one suggested factor to consider would be the implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) between 2010 and 2014. Under the ACA, not only have states had the 
opportunity to expand their Medicaid coverage, but stipulations now demand insurance 
companies to provide birth control coverage at no cost to the patient. This could temper the 
variation in spending outcomes by state such that these more conventional models fail to 
satisfactorily explain the variation that remains. As this aspect of the ACA remains highly 
contested (National Women’s Law Center 2017), future research would do well to continue 
evaluating the extent to which this aspect of the ACA may alleviate some of the inequality 
present in current state family planning funding policies. 
Third, though regression techniques are the most commonly employed in this type of 
analysis, a parallel analysis using alternative methods such as QCA, or a more detailed case 
study of specific states, would allow us to examine more closely how these factors interplay with 
each other. In particular, it could be illuminating to consider which states expanded or failed to 
expand their Medicaid coverage under the ACA, and how this may have shifted coverage for 
family planning services. 
These limitations aside, this project offers two main contributions to the sociological 
literature. First, in its examination of spending for reproductive services, it offers a more gender- 
and race-sensitive approach to the welfare state development literature. Second, it offers an 
empirical approach to our well-developed understanding of the ways in which reproductive 
policy has historically and currently been used to discriminate against women at large, and 
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women of color or those experiencing poverty, in particular. Availability of family planning 
services is crucial for women’s wellbeing, and yet the extent to which they are funded and 
accessible by those most in need critically varies extensively across the U.S. By expanding on 
our collective understanding of the ways in which the full participation of women in society may 
be impeded by certain policies, this project takes a small step toward alleviating unnecessary 
injustice. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics, 3-year avg. (N = 150) 
Type Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
      
Outcome Family planning spending per 
GDP 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.044 
Family planning spending per total 
social spending 0.118 0.056 0.036 0.295 
Functional GDP per capita 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08 
Gini coefficient 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.50 
Unemployment rate 6.98 1.42 3.3 10.3 
% under 18 23.90 1.81 20.75 31.12 
% 65 and older 13.34 1.67 7.60 17.43 
Poverty status 13.68 3.02 8.23 21.61 
Power/Political Unionization 10.78 5.25 3.17 24.43 
Voter turnout 63.98 5.02 51.4 75.8 
Democratic gov't 1.85 1.15 0 3.67 
Voter ID laws 0.97 0.99 0 3.67 
South 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Pre-Roe abortion law 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Gender Poverty by gender     
   Male 12.31 2.75 7.37 19.21 
   Female 15.00 3.29 9.08 23.83 
Need 49.84 7.78 31.45 62.14 
% Female 50.65 0.74 48.08 51.70 
Voter turnout by gender     
   Male 60.63 5.75 47.4 71.5 
   Female 65.93 5.13 53.63 78.37 
% Female legislature 23.81 6.72 10.97 37.33 
Race Female poverty by race     
   White female 11.19 2.60 6.15 18.58 
   Black female 28.74 6.88 10.26 49.32 
Need by race     
   White female 45.95 7.09 28.65 58.35 
   Black female 65.81 9.54 42.72 87.76 
% White 72.00 15.36 23.48 94.65 
% Black 10.25 9.57 0.55 37.24 
Voter turnout by race     
   White 66.27 4.62 53.1 77.13 
   Black✢ 61.69 11.77 36.1 100 
      
✢ N = 47; See text for details.     
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CHAPTER 4 
STATE VARIATION IN POLICIES FOR PUBLICLY-FUNDED ABORTIONS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Although Roe v. Wade legalized abortion at the national level in 1973, the battle between 
pro-choice and pro-life politics continues to rage. It was only three years later that the Hyde 
Amendment was passed. Outwardly anti-choice, Senator Hyde described his distaste for the new 
legalization of abortion: “I would certainly like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an 
abortion: a rich woman, a middle class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle 
available is the... Medicaid bill” (National Women’s Law Center 2017). Specifically, the Hyde 
Amendment states that federal funds are not to be used for abortion except in the case of threat to 
maternal life, or pregnancy as a result of rape or incest (Hasstedt, Sonfield, and Benson Gold 
2017). Thus, even though abortion became legal through Roe v. Wade, the ability for women, 
particularly those reliant on public healthcare services, to access safe abortions remains limited. 
Nevertheless, state autonomy provides individual states with the opportunity to develop 
their own policies toward public spending on abortions. Therefore, though states are required to 
spend public funds on abortion in the emergency situations described above, they can opt in to 
spend additional state funds on abortion in a wider range of circumstances. Currently, 17 states 
have opted for such (Figure 4.1). In this chapter, I thus investigate why some states have opted 
in, while others have not. In the previous two chapters I considered variation in public funding, 
both at large and for family planning services specifically. Public spending for abortion overlaps 
with these two from a definitional standpoint, yet from a societal standpoint abortion as a service 
and a political topic carries a very different social weight. To what extent, then, do we see similar 
  146 
welfare state variables shaping policy for abortion spending as we did in the previous two 
chapters? 
I answer these questions using two different methodologies: binary logistic regression 
and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This chapter thus serves two purposes. First, it 
extends the theoretical and methodological insights from the previous chapters to a more 
contentious reproductive healthcare policy, funding for abortion. As suggested previously, the 
literature on welfare state development has often excluded spending for both healthcare at large 
and reproductive healthcare specifically. Examination of spending for a reproductive healthcare 
service that has been and currently remains politicized and divisive (Carmon 2016; Center for 
Reproductive Rights 2014; Jozkowski, Crawford, and Hunt 2018; Luker 1984) is fruitful in 
expanding the welfare state literature. Second, it delves into the methodological debates on best 
practices for conducting comparative research. Scholars have made significant efforts to discuss 
the benefits and shortcomings of using conventional correlational-based approaches (regression) 
in small-N studies of the welfare state (see e.g. methodological symposium in Mjöset and 
Clausen [2007]). By analyzing my data with QCA alongside logistic regression, I can offer a 
contribution to this well-developed body of literature. 
 
2 THEORY 
As in previous chapters, here I employ general theories of welfare state development 
alongside gendered and racialized notions of the ways in which policy formation occurs within 
the U.S. context. A summary of hypotheses can be seen in Table 1.1. 
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2.1 Conventional Theories of Welfare State Development 
Scholars of the welfare state identify two main arguments for why certain states develop 
more robust social spending programs than others. First, functional scholars maintain that state 
wealth in large part drives funding, with the understanding that a state requires a large enough 
economic surplus in order to consider investing those funds back into its population for social 
services (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975). These authors also highlight the role that need plays in 
shaping policy outcomes, with the understanding that policy should reflect the needs of the 
populace. Thus, we expect states with greater wealth, as well as higher need for abortion services 
to provide more liberal abortion policy (H1). 
The second set of arguments for a developed welfare state concerns the political space 
and previous policy decisions (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003; Cauthen and Amenta 1996; 
Quadagno 1987, 2004; Skocpol and Amenta 1986), as well as the extent to which citizens can 
collectively bargain to enact on their political rights (Korpi 1989; Quadagno 1987; Skocpol and 
Amenta 1986); what Huber and Stephens (2010) term the “power constellation” theory. One 
means of bargaining often studied is the extent of unionization, with the expectation that better 
union representation will result in state policy that more directly addresses its citizen’s collective 
needs. Another avenue considered is the extent to which citizens use their right to vote to shift 
policy in their favor. Thus, we might expect that higher levels of unionization and voter 
engagement, particularly on the part of women, would be favorable to more liberal abortion 
policy (H2). However, given the divisive nature of the abortion question, perhaps this is only true 
in states with an already more liberal populace. 
Related closely to the extent to which citizens enact on their power is the political space 
in which these decisions are being made and implemented. This includes attention to political 
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party domination, with the Democratic party tending to offer more generous funding for social 
programs in the U.S. case (Quadagno 1987). Going beyond party, scholars also indicate the role 
that historical political legacies can play in shaping more recent policy outcomes (Quadagno 
2004; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). We thus expect that states who have historically been more 
favorable towards liberal abortion policy would remain as such. These scholars also highlight the 
historical exceptionalism of Southern Democrats as well as the South’s slavery-based economy 
as shaping divergent social policy outcomes (Gordon 1994). 
More recent political science scholars call for the importance of considering the influence 
of public opinion on policy decisions (Brooks and Manza 2006b, 2006a; Grammich, DaVanzo, 
and Stewart 2004; Kail and Dixon 2011). In particular, in Burstein’s (2003) review, the author 
indeed finds a close link between public opinion and public policy. This may perhaps be even 
more true for policies set at the state level, given the relatively tight relationship between a 
populace and a locally-elected official necessary for reelection (Cook et al. 1992; Jelen and 
Wilcox 2003). Authors such as Norrander and Wilcox (1999) and Wetstein and Albritton (1995) 
also find a close link between public opinion and policy around abortion access, suggesting that 
states whose populace are more opposed to abortion will have more restrictive policy. 
All together, this body of research suggests that states that have a more liberal legislature 
and citizenry (H3), as well as greater engagement on the part of citizens (H2), will have an 
expanded welfare state. For a topic as politically charged as abortion, I would particularly expect 
these to be driving factors in shaping state policy. 
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2.2 Abortion in the Welfare State 
Scholarship reflects the depth to which the various theories of welfare state development 
described above apply to public spending policy, both globally and within the U.S. Nevertheless, 
a space remains to be filled in terms of how these policies apply to a policy as historically, and 
currently, controversial as abortion. On the one hand, public spending for abortion falls under the 
general umbrella of social services to be provided by the state in order to ensure women’s equal 
social rights (Center for Reproductive Rights 2011; Luna and Luker 2013). In this way, we 
would expect theories of welfare state development to sufficiently explain state funding 
decisions. On the other hand, the moralistic nature of the abortion debate complicates the role 
that the state plays in both providing for its citizens and responding to its citizens concerns. 
Perhaps, then, we might see political factors play a different role in the formation of abortion 
policy than in other public funding decisions. In particular, the role of religious groups in 
shaping the pro-life movement as well as political discourse on the topic (Blanchard 1994; 
Greenhouse and Siegel 2012; Pew Research Center 2013) suggests that religiosity may play an 
important factor, with states whose residents consider themselves to be more religious offering 
more restrictive abortion policy. 
Additionally, abortion policy and practice in and of itself is very much a gendered and 
racialized phenomenon. Thus, it remains relevant to consider the roles that gender and race play 
in shaping abortion policy. As with policy for reproductive healthcare more broadly, the U.S. has 
a long history of using reproductive policy as a means for driving racial inequalities. Whether 
this exists through forcing or coercing women of color to undergo sterilizations (Amnesty 
International 2010; Borrero et al. 2014; Joffe and Parker 2012; Volscho 2010), or in explicitly 
limiting their access to vital reproductive healthcare (Howell and Starrs 2017), scholars on both 
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sides highlight the unequal treatment of women of color compared to White women surrounding 
abortion. This research reflects the possibility of both more and less restrictive abortion policy 
based on the needs of women of color, so we should at the very least expect a difference in the 
extent to which policy reflects White versus Black women’s needs. In addition, given the 
arguments within the larger welfare state literature surrounding racial representation within a 
state, the overall proportion of Black women may play a role in shaping abortion policy, such 
that with greater representation, states are indeed more restrictive of their abortion policy, based 
on the “threat” hypothesis (Key 1949). In this way, we expect states to be more responsive to the 
reproductive needs and representation of White women over Black women (H6). 
In addition, Feminist scholars of the welfare state highlight the importance of a developed 
welfare state in addressing the needs of all citizens, regardless of gender (Bacchi 1999; Lewis 
1992; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1996). In examining a topic 
that is not only inherently gendered, but which also taps into citizen’s broader ideologies around 
gender equality (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Jelen and Wilcox 2003), I draw on this literature. 
Specifically, these authors suggest the positive role that female political representation plays in 
shaping gender-related policy outcomes (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Paxton, Green, and 
Hughes 2008; Poggione 2004). Given the gendered nature of abortion and its role in the 
women’s rights movement (Rohlinger 2002; Stetson 2001), we might expect that states with 
higher counts of female state legislatures would be more likely to develop and pass more liberal 
abortion policy (H5). In addition, state policy should be more reflective of the needs and 
presence of women as compared to men (H4). 
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3 DATA AND METHODS 
A note on terminology: regression and QCA, while overlapping on their use of the data, 
use different terminology to describe the social phenomena being tested. Briefly, whereas in 
regression we have variables, dependent variables, and independent variables, in QCA we 
consider conditions, outcomes, and causal conditions. For the descriptions here, I employ 
regression-based terminology for simplicity. When describing QCA methodology and results, I 
will use QCA terminology.  
 
3.1 Data 
Data for this chapter come from a variety of publicly available sources from the year 
2014, unless otherwise noted. A full list of variables/conditions and their descriptive statistics 
can be seen in Table 4.1. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
The variable I am interested in investigating in this chapter is whether or not a state 
chooses to cover abortion costs for Medicaid recipients, outside of those emergency 
circumstances dictated by federal policy, in the year 2015. This data is available historically from 
the Guttmacher Institute (GI), and more recently from the National Women’s Law Center. The 
original data from GI groups states into two categories, with two subcategories each. In the 
“nonrestrictive” abortion policy group, states confer public funds for abortion in medically 
necessary circumstances beyond those mandated by federal law. This first group is further 
divided into states that opt-in voluntarily, and those that have been mandated to do so by their 
state courts. In the “restrictive” abortion category, states only offer public funds in the federally-
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mandated restrictive circumstances. The majority of restrictive states fall under this category, 
with two exceptions. First is South Dakota, which is currently in violation of federal law,1 second 
are a collection of states that marginally expand eligibility to include circumstances of, e.g. fetal 
anomaly. 
This outcome is chosen in part because of its use by previous scholars of state support for 
abortion access, in particular its relation to public opinion and political processes (Barrilleaux 
and Berkman 2003; Berkman and O’Connor 1993; Meier and McFarlane 1992; Norrander and 
Wilcox 1999). However, as others (Medoff 2012; Medoff and Dennis 2011) note, the validity of 
this measure debatable. Specifically, these authors offer concern for the fact that “nonrestrictive 
abortion policy” combines states that expand their coverage voluntarily with those that are court-
ordered. Medoff (2012:242) argues that “there is a question of causality using state funding of 
Medicaid abortions as a measure of a state’s abortion policy since the main source of variation 
for a state funding Medicaid abortions are state Supreme Courts.” This is why, he suggests, 
finding significant predictors of nonrestrictive Medicaid abortion policy is difficult, and thus opts 
instead to use state Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws2 as a more robust 
outcome. 
Although measurements of TRAP laws cover a wider range of policies, here I have 
chosen to look solely at public funding for abortion for two reasons. First, to be consistent with 
the welfare state literature that considers spending as an outcome, investigating spending for 
abortion in this chapter remains appropriate. Second, because I am using QCA which allows for 
asymmetrical relationships, it is possible that I may find predictive factors to be “significant” that 
                                                 
1 Abortion is only covered by public funds if the woman’s life is at risk. 
2 TRAP laws are a series of legislation passed by the states that inhibit a woman’s access to abortion services. 
Examples include mandatory waiting periods, ultrasounds, and counseling, among others, prior to receiving an 
abortion. 
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do not appear as such in conventional regression analyses. For this analysis, I use a binary 
outcome, where “1” indicates that the state has restrictive abortion policy (has failed to expand 
their spending for abortion) and “0” reflects states with nonrestrictive abortion policy. This 
truncation is done for two reasons: first, for simplicity of analysis; second, without further 
investigation into the court cases mandating nonrestrictive policy I am hesitant to treat these 
groups as categorically different. 
 
3.1.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables for this project are based on the set of welfare state theories 
described above. To represent functional controls of welfare state spending, I include several 
variables: GDP per capita, Gini coefficient, unemployment rate, age, and poverty. GDP data 
comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and is measured in millions of dollars. The Gini 
coefficient is a measure of state income inequality that ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores 
indicating less equality. Next, unemployment rate, percent of population under 18 and over 65, 
and poverty levels are included to capture the extend of need within the state. 
In my second set of models, I include conventional variables related to the 
power/political perspective of welfare state development. Unionization comes from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and percent of employed who are members of unions. Voter participation 
measures the percent of citizens who are 18 years of age or older who voted in the previous 
presidential election, as shown in the Current Population Survey. To capture political factors 
associated with welfare state spending I first test four measures related to government and 
policy: Democratic government, voter ID laws, South, and pre-Roe abortion legislation. 
Democratic government is a scale constructed from data from the Book of States based on the 
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governor’s party (Democratic or Republican) and majority party of the state legislature 
(Democratic, Republican, or Split). Voter ID laws is a 5-point scale indicating type of voter ID 
law (or whether there is such a law) within a state.3 Finally, South and pre-Roe abortion policy 
are included to capture the historical economic and political distinctions of Southern vs. Northern 
Democrats as well as the legacy of early abortion legislation on current policy decisions. Pre-
Roe is dichotomized to represent states in which abortion was legal in some or all circumstances 
(1) or illegal (0). 
Second, given the connection between public opinion and policy, particularly within a 
state context (Burstein 1998, 2003; Cook et al. 1992; Jelen and Wilcox 2003), I include a series 
of aggregated opinion variables. First, liberal political ideology is taken from Berry et al.’s 
(2010) scoring of citizen ideology within a state. This measure is based on a series of factors, 
including “using the roll call voting scores of state congressional delegations, the outcomes of 
congressional elections, the partisan division of state legislatures, the party of the governor, and 
various assumptions regarding voters and state political elites” (Berry et al. 1998:327). These 
measures have undergone several checks of robustness and validity (Berry et al. 1998, 2010) and 
are used throughout the political science literature. The next set of measures comes from Pew 
Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study. Conducted in 2007 and 2014, the Religious 
Landscape Study offers a nationally-representative sample of responses relating to among other 
social issues, abortion and religion. Though several other surveys target opinion on similar 
topics, most notably the General Social Survey, few others offer data at the state level. As such, 
this data is ideal for the study of abortion policy and opinion in the context of this project. 
Specifically, I include a measure of the percent of people within a state who support legal 
                                                 
3 Specifically, where: 0 = none; 1 = non-strict non-photo ID required; 2 = non-strict photo ID required; 3 = strict 
non-photo ID required; and 4 = strict photo ID required 
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abortion in some or all forms, as well as a series of variables targeting the level of religiosity 
within a state. These include the percent of citizens who identify as Evangelical, mainline 
Protestant, or Catholic, as well as average importance of religion within the state, with higher 
values indicating higher religiosity. 
In additional models, I consider the extent to which gender and race shape the impact of 
some of these power and political factors. Specifically, I disaggregate poverty by gender, and 
then female poverty by race. I disaggregate voting by gender and race4 as well, and include 
population proportions representing the percent of women, percent White, and percent Black 
within the state. To capture the importance of female political representation, beyond political 
engagement of the citizen, I include the percent of women in state legislature from the Center for 
American Women in Politics. 
Another variable related to female poverty, need for publicly funded contraceptive 
services, is considered here as well. Need is taken from the Guttmacher Institute’s regular report 
on contraceptive needs and services (Frost, Frohwirth, and Zolna 2016). This measure takes into 
account census data such as age and income, alongside data from the National Survey of Family 
Growth indicating likelihood of becoming pregnant alongside desire to not have a child. 
Together, this measure captures the number of women in need of publicly funded contraceptives, 
as a percent of the total number of women in need of contraceptives in a state. Even though this 
chapter’s main focus is abortion, this measure of need serves as an appropriate proxy for 
considering the extent to which a state has a high proportion of women who are: 1) sexually 
active; 2) not wanting to have children; and 3) living below the poverty level. Need is included 
overall, as well as disaggregated by race (White and Black). 
                                                 
4 Black voting data is unavailable for ID, MT, and SD; these states are excluded from analysis for those models that 
employ this variable. 
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3.2 Methods 
Two different methodological techniques are pursued in this chapter: binary logistic 
regression and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). As mentioned in Chapter 1, debate 
abounds as to the most valid and reliable ways of observing and analyzing variation in social 
spending between states. Regression remains the standard, yet limitations exist of the extent to 
which correlation-based techniques can capture the picture of what is going on, particularly with 
the small-N cases often presented to scholars of the welfare state. Where regression offers mean-
centered analysis of correlations, QCA treats each state as an individual case, allowing 
relationships to be asymmetrical. In addition, through QCA I can better examine the overlapping 
relationships between “independent variables” or “causal conditions” as they relate to my 
outcome, a state’s failure to opt-in to use of Medicaid for abortion. 
 
3.2.1 Regression 
The regression technique I pursue is binary logistic regression, based on the outcome of 
whether a state fails to opt-in to expanded coverage of abortion for Medicaid recipients. Because 
I am looking at a single time point (based in part on data availability), I am restricted by my 
number of cases, 50. Thus, although I build up models in a manner similar to Chapter 2, my 
combined models are limited in the number of variables, particularly given logistic regression’s 
sensitivity to multicollinearity. 
I thus present three sets of models. The first regresses conventional functional and 
power/political variables on the outcome. A parsimonious model is developed here using single 
elimination based on amount of explained variance of each variable. Next, I incorporate 
variables such as poverty and voting rate disaggregated by gender and race into the parsimonious 
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power/political model. Whereas in previous in chapters I combined certain characteristics 
together in a “full” model, the lack of explanatory power prevents me from doing so here. All 
regression analyses are done using Stata 13 (StataCorp 2013). 
 
3.2.2 QCA 
QCA applies a Boolean algebra approach to the study of comparative welfare states. 
Utilizing logics from set theory, QCA considers the extent to which states occupy overlapping 
sets of conditions. For example, for my outcome, I am interested in the set of states that have 
restrictive abortion policy. As a second condition, say I am interested in the set of states that 
have a low percent of citizens in favor of legal abortion. With QCA, I can determine the states 
that fall within both of these sets, and in this way, explore the extent to which low support for 
legal abortion is a necessary or sufficient condition for a state having restrictive abortion policy. 
In addition, I can repeat this process with simultaneous evaluation of multiple conditions, 
allowing me to examine the extent to which a specific combination of conditions is necessary or 
sufficient for my outcome. I thus use QCA here to test the theoretical paradigms described 
above. Furthermore, QCA takes a hybrid approach to the study of comparative welfare states, 
drawing from both qualitative and quantitative paradigms (Ragin 2008; Rubinson and Ragin 
2007). In this way, the theories presented above can be tested inductively through the QCA 
algorithm. 
From a case-oriented perspective, knowledge of the cases (in this project, the 50 states) is 
vital in constructing the conditions used in exploring causal links of restrictive abortion policy. I 
thus take the variables described above, representing various theoretical approaches to the study 
of welfare state development, and use them to construct fuzzy sets to be tested with QCA. The 
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process of constructing these fuzzy sets through calibration is grounded in knowledge of the 
case, as well as a theoretical understanding of what represents, for example, low vs. high GDP in 
the context of the U.S. The calibration itself takes place in the fsQCA software, based on cutoffs 
for full, partial, and null membership within each set (condition) as decided by the researcher.5 
The first step in conducting QCA is to decide on the set of cases. In this project, my 
selection is based on wanting to comprehensively examine variation across all U.S. states. 
Therefore, case selection is straightforward in that I am including all fifty states.6 Next, 
conditions are calibrated using a theoretical understanding of the measures alongside case 
knowledge, as well as the data itself. This process allows for the conversion of categorical or 
continuous measures into sets, and is importantly descriptive: e.g. high levels of poverty, rather 
than just poverty. Calibration is conducted by choosing three cut-points, or values representing: 
1) total inclusion in the set; 2) a crossover point between more in than out of the set; and 3) total 
exclusion from the set. Inputting these values into the fsQCA software allows me to convert 
those continuous or categorical variables used in the logistic regressions described above into 
fuzzy set conditions. 
Once conditions have been calibrated, I follow the four steps of the fuzzy truth table 
algorithm using the fsQCA software: 1) explore whether specific conditions are necessary and/or 
sufficient for my outcome; 2) test various combinations of conditions using the subset/superset 
procedure; 3) construct and pare down the truth table; and 4) analyze the truth table. I conclude 
by evaluating membership in the intermediate solution set using a logistic regression predicting 
my outcome, restrictive abortion policy. 
                                                 
5 Table 4.5 shows the cut-points used for each of the conditions tested here. 
6 This excludes Washington DC. 
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In order to be consistent with the logics of the regression analysis, preliminary steps (1-2) 
are conducted based on each condition’s theoretical groundings from the welfare state literature. 
Based on these results, I select a set of conditions to analyze in combination. These include Black 
female poverty, unionization, Democratic government, and female legislative representation. In 
doing so, I target not only the extent to which different theoretical frames help explain my 
outcome, but also whether a combination of different aspects of these perspectives is more 
suitable. All analyses are done using the fsQCA software, version 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2017). 
 
4 FINDINGS 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
Overall, 33 out of the 50 states maintain restrictive abortion coverage; that is, fail to offer 
public funds in cases of abortion outside of those mandated by federal government. The map in 
Figure 4.1 reflects these findings. We see several differences in values of the independent 
variables by abortion policy status (Table 4.1). Most notably, those states with more restrictive 
abortion policy have higher levels of need, both overall and by race, for publicly funded 
contraceptives (Figure 4.2). These findings suggest that state abortion policy may not be 
particularly reflective of the reproductive needs of their female citizens. Simultaneously, there 
seems to be policy differences based on the public opinion of individuals within those states 
(Figure 4.3). Specifically, we find that states with restrictive abortion policy have significantly 
more Evangelical Protestants and fewer respondents in support of abortion. Interestingly, these 
states also have significantly fewer Catholics. 
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Figure 4.1 Restrictive abortion coverage by state, 2014 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Need by race and abortion policy (differences in parentheses) 
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Figure 4.3 Average religion and abortion opinion by abortion policy type 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
Next, I turn to inferential results. First, I present results from the binary logistic 
regression analysis described above in Tables 4.2-4. The first set of models examines the role of 
conventional functional and power/political variables in shaping spending outcomes (Table 4.2). 
Interestingly, of the standard set of functional variables used previously in this project (Model 1), 
none are significant. Of conventional power/political variables, unionization and Democratic 
government seem to be most highly correlated with the outcome, and both negatively so (as 
expected). Of opinion measures, only religiosity is significantly, positively, associated with the 
outcome, and this only marginally so. When these three significant variables are incorporated 
into a single more parsimonious model, religiosity indeed loses its significance. 
Moving on to Table 4.3, I incorporate measures related to the gendered aspects of power 
and political engagement. Here we fail to see significant associations between any of my 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
% Evangelical % Mainline Protestant % Catholic % Support legal abortion
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Overall Non-restrictive Restrictive
******
  162 
variables and the outcome. Notably, female legislative representation is not significant, yet its 
explanatory power can be seen in that Democratic government loses significance and 
unionization becomes only marginally significant. The direction of this variable is as expected, 
with higher levels of female political representation associated with less restrictive abortion 
policy. Similarly, Table 4.4 shows the race variables to show little significant effect as well. 
White and Black population proportions are both significant, but in the same direction, 
obfuscating any real connection between them and the outcome. Black voter turnout is 
marginally positively associated with more restrictive abortion policy, tapping into a debate on 
how respondent race may impact opinion on abortion (Carter, Carter, and Dodge 2009; Hall and 
Ferree 1986; Wilcox 1990, 1992). Notably, although female poverty by race fails to show 
significant differences, overall poverty by race reflects a marginally positive association between 
Black poverty levels and more restrictive abortion policy. Similarly, separating White and Black 
need into different models shows Black women’s needs to be positively associated with more 
restrictive policy.7 
 
4.3 QCA: Preliminary Findings 
My first step in analyzing this data using QCA is to examine the consistency and 
coverage for necessity for each condition individually (that is, the extent to which a condition is 
necessary and/or sufficient for my outcome). Table 4.6 shows consistency and coverage scores 
for necessity for each condition, as well as its negation, by theoretical framework. In examining 
conditions derived from the functional perspective, we do not see any that are particularly high in 
consistency. The highest ranking is a lack of high GDP per capita, a condition that also has 
                                                 
7 Results not shown. 
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decent coverage. Moving on to class power conditions, a lack of high unionization ranks 
markedly high in consistency for necessity, suggesting this condition is a shared antecedent with 
restrictive abortion policy. A lack of a Democratic government also has a somewhat high 
consistency score, and its coverage is highest among these conditions. Interestingly, although 
overall religious importance has a somewhat high consistency score, a lack of high Protestant 
and Catholic representation also have relatively high consistency scores, though less-so. 
Taking gender into account yields mixed results. The highest scoring condition here on 
both necessity and sufficiency is a lack high female legislative representation, supporting 
gendered notions of the welfare state. This finding is countered by the somewhat high 
consistency score of high female voting participation. We also see relatively high consistency 
scores for high female poverty and need, suggesting that abortion policy may not be entirely 
reflective of need. When these need and poverty measures are disaggregated by race, the 
relationship between high Black female poverty and need and a state’s restrictive abortion policy 
becomes particularly salient. High Black female poverty yields the highest consistency score of 
all conditions, with a sizable coverage score as well. When examining high White poverty and 
need, we see that a lack of both has higher consistency scores than the presence of either, 
reiterating this relationship. 
Based on these scores, I proceed with the subset/superset analysis, the results of which 
can be seen in Table 4.8.8 For functional factors, results overall do not reflect particularly high 
sufficiency. The highest sufficiency score comes in at 0.71, a three-way tie between 
combinations of conditions that all include a lack of high GDP per capita. The highest coverage 
score indeed is lack of high GDP per capita on its own. Conventional power/political conditions 
                                                 
8 Conditions were selected based on their high consistency scores for necessity and for theoretical contributions. 
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yield more fruitful results. The two recipes with the highest sufficiency scores thus far (0.91) are 
1) high religiosity and a lack of unionization and 2) high religiosity and a lack of unionization 
and Democratic government, both of which yield relatively high coverage scores as well. In 
addition, lack of unionization retains the highest coverage score thus far, reflecting results from 
Table 4.6. These first findings suggest the importance of political factors, as well as public 
opinion and engagement, in shaping abortion legislation. 
Next, in examining gendered power/political conditions, results are not as strong, though 
we do see somewhat high sufficiency scores. A lack of high female political representation 
appears to contribute to almost all of the highest-scoring recipes. Interesting, high need and high 
poverty once again appear to counterintuitively overlap with more restrictive abortion policy. 
When these measures are further disaggregated by race, sufficiency scores become more 
middling, the highest being 0.67. Nevertheless, high Black need, and especially high Black 
female poverty yield particularly high coverage scores, suggesting that like a lack of high 
unionization, high Black female poverty is a shared antecedent of restrictive abortion policy. 
Given the utility of QCA in considering the extent to which combinations of specific 
factors lead to an outcome, I next test how individual factors from each of these paradigms might 
overlap in their effects on shaping abortion policy. Indeed, when examining scores in Table 4.7, 
we see both gendered and racialized factors having high necessity scores, alongside more 
conventional power/political factors. Specifically, Black female poverty and need for publicly 
funded contraceptives remain highly ranked, as does a lack of unionization and female political 
representation. The highest-scoring functional condition, on the other hand (a lack of high GDP 
per capita), falls lower at 0.70. Using the subset/superset feature to further explore the 
combinations of the most necessary conditions (Table 4.8), we see that the combination of Black 
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female poverty with a lack of female and Democratic political representation scores notably high 
on both sufficiency (0.93) and coverage (0.70), particularly given the binary operationalization 
of my outcome. Lack of unionization also appears frequently in this series of causal recipes. 
 
4.4 QCA: Truth Table and Solution 
Moving on to the last two steps of the QCA algorithm, a full truth table can be seen in 
Table 4.9. Based on the analysis of necessary conditions and the subset/superset procedure, the 
conditions I examine here include high Black female poverty, high unionization, majority 
Democratic governmental representation, and high female political representation. Notably, the 
intermediate solution includes all four conditions, with presence/absence of each condition 
appearing as expected. This solution calls for high poverty among Black women combined with a 
lack of unionization as well as a lack of female and Democratic political representation. The 
sufficiency score for this solution ranks high (0.94), and the solution offers a high coverage score 
(0.69) as well. In the parsimonious solution, the unionization term is removed from the recipe. 9 
As such, these solutions highlight the utility of combining factors from multiple theoretical 
frames, as well as the continued importance of racial political and power mechanisms in shaping 
outcomes on abortion policy. 
The results from the truth table are visualized in Figure 4.4. Here, darker shades represent 
higher solution consistency, and the numbers within each sector indicate the number of states 
with at least a 0.5 membership score in that combination of factors. In addition to highlighting  
                                                 
9 A prime implicant tie exists for the presence of Black female poverty and absence of each other factor, such that I 
needed to choose between presence of Black female poverty or absence of unionization combined with the other two 
conditions. I chose the recipe containing Black female poverty on theoretical grounds; choosing the other solution 
shows lack of high unionization to be the third condition present in the parsimonious solution.   
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Figure 4.4 Venn diagram of intermediate solution and case distribution (darker shades represent higher solution 
consistency) 
 
the intermediate solution results, this chart helps us recognize that there appears to be a variety of 
paths for states who have less restrictive abortion policy, but fewer for those who restrict their 
abortion funding. I further investigate the membership in the intermediate solution by specific 
states in Figure 4.5. Here we see that darker states, such as South Carolina or Oklahoma, have 
higher membership in the solution set, while lighter states such as California or Vermont have 
lower membership. In referring back to Figure 4.1, there are appropriate overlaps between these 
states and their abortion policy. 
I test this more rigorously by conducting a logistic regression of the outcome using 
membership in the intermediate solution as my independent variable. The results of this can be 
seen in Table 4.10 and visualized in Figures 4.6-7. From the regression results we recognize a 
positive, significant association between solution set membership and restrictive abortion policy.  
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Figure 4.5 Map of membership in intermediate solution set: high Black female poverty combined with lack of high 
unionization, lack of high female political representation, and lack of high Democratic political 
representation (0 = non-membership, 1 = full membership) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Membership in intermediate solution set by abortion policy type 
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Figure 4.7 Probability of supporting restrictive abortion policy by membership in the solution set 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Probability of supporting restrictive abortion policy by governmental majority party 
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Indeed, the average membership scores for the two policy groups are both meaningfully and 
significantly different from each other (Figure 4.6). Calculating predicted probabilities reiterates 
this finding (Figure 4.7) as we see the upward trend in probability of supporting restrictive 
abortion policy (y-axis) with an increase in set membership. 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examine the extent to which conventional measures of welfare state 
development explain differential abortion policy across the U.S. Although spending for abortion 
in some ways falls under traditional studies of social welfare and spending, given its 
characterization as a particularly politically- and religiously-charged topic, a question remains as 
to the extent to which these conventional explanatory factors hold up in studies of abortion 
spending. I thus proceed by running a series of binary logistic regression models considering 
how these conventional factors affect the odds of a state having more restrictive abortion funding 
policies. In addition, I incorporate specific variables related to the racialization of abortion policy 
to determine the extent to which racialized theories of the welfare state, specifically the “threat” 
hypothesis, is reflected in abortion policy. 
Overall, regression findings offer only middling support for the majority of conventional 
welfare state measures. One exception is role of unionization and Democratic governments in 
passing less restrictive abortion policy. Predicted probabilities based on varying levels of 
Democratic government (Figure 4.8) reveal the downward probability of boasting restrictive 
abortion policy as Democrats gain power. However, given the strength of these political and 
power factors in shaping policy outcomes, we fail to see the significant relationship between 
poverty and policy on publicly-funded abortions that was so present in previous chapters. This is 
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further carried out in the association’s failure to reach meaningful significance when poverty is 
disaggregated by gender and/or race. This counters some of those results seen in previous 
chapters, as well as what would be suggested by racialized and gendered perspectives on welfare 
state development. 
Another goal of this chapter is to evaluate conventional regression techniques alongside 
one alternative approach to comparative welfare states, QCA. In order to parallel the logistic 
regression, I first conduct analyses of individual conditions based on each theoretical paradigm 
individually. Though useful in identifying those individual conditions within each framework 
that offer the highest consistency scores, taken individually, the causal recipes were somewhat 
limited in their explanatory power. Between functional and power/political solutions, the latter 
yield the higher consistency and coverage scores, suggesting the utility of citizen engagement in 
explaining state abortion policy, as well as the ubiquity of the political conditions in doing so. 
Combining various conditions from each of the three paradigms proves beneficial in 
constructing causal recipes. From this analysis we also find the persistent role of Black female 
poverty, among other factors, in shaping abortion policy. Specifically, in all three iterations of 
this final set of solutions, high female poverty is shown to be one of the necessary conditions for 
a state having restrictive funding for abortions. The intermediate solution of high Black female 
poverty, combined with a lack of high unionization and Democratic and female representation, 
proves robust to further analysis using logistic regression. 
These findings reflect a lack of recognition on the part of policymakers on women’s 
reproductive needs, and in particular the needs of Black women experiencing poverty. Scholars 
of the racialized welfare state describe the role of Black representation in shaping policy 
outcomes (Brown 2013; Reese, Ramirez, and Estrada-Correa 2013); yet this finding is suggestive 
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of an additional political mechanism. That is, the extent to which state policy is differentially 
responsive to citizens’ needs by, in this case, race. In suggesting that state policy is at best not 
impacted by women’s needs, and at worst in opposition to (Black) women’s needs, this study 
highlights the role of the state in perpetuating race, class, and gender inequalities. In doing so, it 
emphasizes the importance of considering race and gender alongside class in studies of the 
welfare state. For future work, consideration of opinion disaggregated by race might be helpful 
in further elucidating mechanisms for the race effects observed here.  
Comparison of regression results to QCA results also provides useful information in 
debates on how to best establish causation within the welfare state literature. First, we see that 
certain “significant” variables overlap with highly “necessary” conditions, such as unionization 
and Democratic representation. At the same time, the conclusions we draw from the two methods 
are slightly different. The regression results, for example, allow us to calculate predictive odds of 
a state adopting more restrictive abortion policy, based on the series of independent variables 
included here. Yet they are limited given the sample size and issues with collinearity. QCA 
results, on the other hand, highlight the overlapping nature of these variables, or conditions, in 
identifying states with restrictive policy. In addition, through QCA we observe the fact that 
although several pathways exist to having more robust abortion policy, fewer lead to restrictive 
policy. This suggests the utility of taking a range of approaches to expanding public funding for 
abortions at the state level to pro-choice advocates. 
Furthermore, findings from the QCA analysis in many ways provide much larger support 
for the role of the racialized welfare state in shaping abortion policy than do those from the 
logistic regression. In addition to supporting the continued comparison of regression results to 
alternative methods, this finding emphasizes the intersectional and combinatorial nature of 
  172 
welfare state characteristics, particularly for something as socially complex as abortion. Other 
scholars (Nalepa and Gran 2018) have applied QCA to comparative studies of abortion policy, 
and future research would do well to continue on this trend. 
Together, these two methods provide rich information in our attempts to better 
understand variation in abortion policy between U.S. states. In this way, this chapter expands the 
literature on welfare state development to a complex social topic, abortion. Nevertheless, there 
are several avenues for expansion and improvement. First, although this project uses a 
dichotomized outcome to describe state abortion policy, variation exists between states in their 
exact abortion policies (for example, distinguishing between those states that voluntarily opt in to 
robust abortion coverage and those that are mandated by their state courts to do so). Second, 
similarly, future work should incorporate other laws outside of public spending in order to 
capture a more holistic picture of support for abortion within a given state (Medoff 2012; Medoff 
and Dennis 2011). Third, a more detailed case analysis could potentially better capture when, 
where, and why certain states choose to restrict their abortion funding. Although few states 
change their policies within the time period in which this data is collected, further study of those 
states that do may provide a better temporal picture of catalysis of abortion restrictions. 
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Table 4.6 Consistency and coverage scores for necessity for all conditions and their negations, by condition type 
Type Condition Consistency Coverage 
        
Functional GDP per capita 0.30 0.57 
Functional ~ GDP per capita 0.70 0.71 
Functional Gini 0.62 0.65 
Functional ~ Gini 0.38 0.68 
Functional Unemployment 0.62 0.63 
Functional ~ Unemployment 0.38 0.72 
Functional Young 0.33 0.73 
Functional ~ Young 0.67 0.63 
Functional Old 0.56 0.65 
Functional ~ Old 0.44 0.67 
Functional Poverty 0.53 0.72 
Functional ~ Poverty 0.47 0.60  
   
        
Power/Political Union 0.06 0.23 
Power/Political ~ Union 0.94 0.76 
Power/Political Vote 0.65 0.69 
Power/Political ~ Vote 0.35 0.61 
Power/Political Democratic 0.23 0.36 
Power/Political ~ Democratic 0.77 0.88 
Power/Political Voter ID laws 0.53 0.85 
Power/Political ~ Voter ID laws 0.47 0.53 
Power/Political South 0.39 0.81 
Power/Political ~ South 0.61 0.59 
Power/Political Abortion legal Pre-Roe 0.33 0.55 
Power/Political ~ Abortion legal pre-Roe 0.67 0.73 
Power/Political Evangelical 0.56 0.75 
Power/Political ~ Evangelical 0.44 0.57 
Power/Political Catholic 0.28 0.55 
Power/Political ~ Catholic 0.72 0.71 
Power/Political Protestant 0.26 0.70 
Power/Political ~ Protestant 0.74 0.65 
Power/Political Religiosity 0.78 0.73 
Power/Political ~ Religiosity 0.22 0.50 
Power/Political Liberal ideology 0.35 0.49 
Power/Political ~ Liberal ideology 0.65 0.82 
Power/Political Support legal abortion 0.60 0.57 
Power/Political ~ Support legal abortion 0.40 0.87 
        
    
~ = Negation    
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Table 4.6 Continued 
Type Condition Consistency Coverage 
        
Gender Female poverty 0.64 0.72 
Gender ~ Female poverty 0.36 0.57 
Gender Male poverty 0.41 0.72 
Gender ~ Male poverty 0.59 0.62 
Gender Need 0.69 0.78 
Gender ~ Need 0.31 0.49 
Gender Female population 0.57 0.69 
Gender ~ Female population 0.43 0.62 
Gender Female vote 0.73 0.68 
Gender ~ Female vote 0.27 0.61 
Gender Male vote 0.56 0.69 
Gender ~ Male vote 0.44 0.63 
Gender Female legislature 0.15 0.35 
Gender ~ Female legislature 0.85 0.79 
         
   
Race White female poverty 0.24 0.74 
Race ~ White female poverty 0.76 0.64 
Race Black female poverty 0.99 0.68 
Race ~ Black female poverty 0.01 0.17 
Race White need 0.31 0.66 
Race ~ White need 0.69 0.66 
Race Black need 0.90 0.66 
Race ~ Black need 0.10 0.68 
Race White population 0.60 0.73 
Race ~ White population 0.40 0.58 
Race Black population 0.32 0.80 
Race ~ Black population 0.68 0.61 
Race White vote 0.71 0.64 
Race ~ White vote 0.29 0.70 
Race Black vote 0.61 0.67 
Race ~ Black vote 0.41 0.35 
        
    
~ = Negation    
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Table 4.7 Consistency and coverage scores for necessity for all conditions and their negations, by consistency 
Type Condition Consistency Coverage 
        
Race Black female poverty 0.99 0.68 
Power/Political ~ Union 0.94 0.76 
Race Black need 0.90 0.66 
Gender ~ Female legislature 0.85 0.79 
Power/Political Religiosity 0.78 0.73 
         
   
Power/Political ~ Democratic 0.77 0.88 
Race ~ White female poverty 0.76 0.64 
Power/Political ~ Protestant 0.74 0.65 
Gender Female vote 0.73 0.68 
Power/Political ~ Catholic 0.72 0.71 
Race White vote 0.71 0.64 
Functional ~ GDP per capita 0.70 0.71 
Gender Need 0.69 0.78 
Race ~ White need 0.69 0.66 
Race ~ Black population 0.68 0.61 
Power/Political ~ Abortion legal pre-Roe 0.67 0.73 
Functional ~ Young 0.67 0.63 
Power/Political Vote 0.65 0.69 
Power/Political ~ Liberal ideology 0.65 0.82 
Gender Female poverty 0.64 0.72 
Functional Unemployment 0.62 0.63 
Functional Gini 0.62 0.65 
Race Black vote 0.61 0.67 
Power/Political ~ South 0.61 0.59 
Power/Political Support legal abortion 0.60 0.57 
Race White population 0.60 0.73 
Gender ~ Male poverty 0.59 0.62 
Gender Female population 0.57 0.69 
Power/Political Evangelical 0.56 0.75 
Functional Old 0.56 0.65 
Gender Male vote 0.56 0.69 
Functional Poverty 0.53 0.72 
Power/Political Voter ID laws 0.53 0.85 
Power/Political ~ Voter ID laws 0.47 0.53 
Functional ~ Poverty 0.47 0.60 
Gender ~ Male vote 0.44 0.63 
Functional ~ Old 0.44 0.67 
Power/Political ~ Evangelical 0.44 0.57 
        
    
~ = Negation    
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Table 4.7 Continued 
Type Condition Consistency Coverage 
        
Gender ~ Female population 0.43 0.62 
Race ~ Black vote 0.41 0.35 
Gender Male poverty 0.41 0.72 
Race ~ White population 0.40 0.58 
Power/Political ~ Support legal abortion 0.40 0.87 
Power/Political South 0.39 0.81 
Functional ~ Gini 0.38 0.68 
Functional ~ Unemployment 0.38 0.72 
Gender ~ Female poverty 0.36 0.57 
Power/Political Liberal ideology 0.35 0.49 
Power/Political ~ Vote 0.35 0.61 
Functional Young 0.33 0.73 
Power/Political Abortion legal Pre-Roe 0.33 0.55 
Race Black population 0.32 0.80 
Race White need 0.31 0.66 
Gender ~ Need 0.31 0.49 
Functional GDP per capita 0.30 0.57 
Race ~ White vote 0.29 0.70 
Power/Political Catholic 0.28 0.55 
Gender ~ Female vote 0.27 0.61 
Power/Political Protestant 0.26 0.70 
Race White female poverty 0.24 0.74 
Power/Political Democratic 0.23 0.36 
Power/Political ~ Religiosity 0.22 0.50 
Gender Female legislature 0.15 0.35 
Race ~ Black need 0.10 0.68 
Power/Political Union 0.06 0.23 
Race ~ Black female poverty 0.01 0.17 
        
    
~ = Negation    
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Table 4.8 Subset/superset analysis results, sorted by coverage✢   
Type Recipe Consistency for sufficiency 
Coverage for 
sufficiency 
Functional ~gdpfz*unempfz 0.71 0.55 
~gdpfz 0.71 0.70 
~gdpfz*ginifz 0.71 0.54 
~gdpfz*unempfz*ginifz 0.70 0.49 
~gdpfz*~youngfz*ginifz 0.69 0.48 
~gdpfz*~youngfz*unempfz 0.69 0.46 
~gdpfz*~youngfz*unempfz*ginifz 0.69 0.44 
      
Power/Political ~unionfz 0.75 0.94  
relimpfz 0.73 0.78  
~unionfz*relimpfz 0.78 0.78  
~demfz 0.88 0.77  
~unionfz*~demfz 0.91 0.74  
relimpfz*~demfz 0.89 0.65  
~unionfz*relimpfz*~demfz 0.91 0.65  
   
Gender ~legffz*needfz 0.85 0.67  
~legffz*povffz 0.81 0.63  
~legffz*needfz*povffz 0.84 0.59  
voteffz*needfz 0.80 0.56  
~legffz*voteffz*needfz 0.86 0.55  
~legffz*voteffz*povffz 0.82 0.50  
voteffz*needfz*povffz 0.80 0.49  
~legffz*voteffz*needfz*povffz 0.85 0.48 
        
Race povfbfz 0.68 0.99  
needbfz 0.66 0.90  
povfbfz*needbfz 0.68 0.90  
povfbfz*~povfwfz 0.66 0.76  
povfbfz*votewfz 0.67 0.72  
povfbfz*needbfz*~povfwfz 0.67 0.71  
povfbfz*needbfz*votewfz 0.66 0.66  
povfbfz*~povfwfz*votewfz 0.66 0.65  
povfbfz*needbfz*~povfwfz*votewfz 0.66 0.62 
        
✢ Consistency cutoffs  
 
      Functional: 0.69  
 
      Power/Political: n/a  
 
      Gender: 0.80   
      Race: 0.66   
      Combined: 0.93  
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Table 4.8 Continued✢   
Type Recipe Consistency for sufficiency 
Coverage for 
sufficiency 
Combined  povfbfz*~legffz*~demfz 0.93 0.70 
~unionfz*~legffz*~demfz 0.94 0.70 
~unionfz*povfbfz*~legffz*~demfz 0.94 0.69 
~unionfz*needbfz*~demfz 0.93 0.67 
~unionfz*needbfz*povfbfz*~demfz 0.93 0.67 
povfbfz*~legffz*relimpfz*~demfz 0.93 0.65 
~unionfz*~legffz*relimpfz*~demfz 0.94 0.65 
~unionfz*povfbfz*~legffz*relimpfz*~demfz 0.94 0.65  
~unionfz*needbfz*~legffz*~demfz 0.94 0.63  
~unionfz*needbfz*povfbfz*~legffz*~demfz 0.94 0.63 
  ~unionfz*needbfz*~legffz*relimpfz*~demfz 0.93 0.60 
 ~unionfz*needbfz*povfbfz*~legffz*relimpfz*~demfz 0.93 0.60 
    
✢ Consistency cutoffs  
 
      Functional: 0.69  
 
      Power/Political: n/a  
 
      Gender: 0.80   
      Race: 0.66   
      Combined: 0.93  
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Table 4.10 Binary logistic regression of traditional variables on restrictive abortion coverage, 2014 (N = 50) 
  coef   se 
      
Membership in solution set 6.063 *** (1.60) 
       
Pseudo r2     0.490 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The exceptional status of the American healthcare system, particularly in regard to 
women’s reproductive care, continues to puzzle academics and activists alike. In comparison 
with its industrialized peers, the United States continues to provide some of the worst forms of 
protection for women, while still maintaining one of the highest rates of female poverty (Orloff 
1996). Importantly, these disadvantages are not equally distributed among women, with women 
of color bearing the brunt of this inequality, particularly in regard to reproductive healthcare 
services (Center for Reproductive Rights 2011; DuMonthier, Childers, and Milli 2017; Howell 
and Starrs 2017; Joffe and Parker 2012). As such, this project seeks to better understand how and 
why variation exists between U.S. states on their support of publicly funded reproductive 
healthcare. In doing so, I explore larger questions of the state’s role in perpetuating or mitigating 
instances of inequality along lines of gender, race, and class. 
In Chapter 1, I provided an outline of the theoretical and historical motivations for 
studying state variation in spending for reproductive healthcare. Drawing from conventional 
notions of welfare state development, I described how functional, alongside power and political, 
factors tend to shape the extent to which a state invests in social protections. Additionally, I 
highlighted how racialized and gendered social processes play out within the welfare state 
development process, and the importance of applying an intersectional lens to comparative 
welfare state studies. This is particularly true when considering spending for reproductive 
healthcare services. The history of family planning policy emphasizes the extent to which racial 
prejudices play out in both policy-making and implementation processes. We see the sustained 
  196 
influence of racial prejudice today, when preventing access to affordable reproductive healthcare 
disproportionately hurts women of color experiencing poverty (Hasstedt 2017; Howell and Starrs 
2017). As such, careful examination of the variation of support for reproductive healthcare 
between states is both timely and theoretically intriguing. 
Chapter 2 set the stage for investigation into the question of how and why states vary in 
their support of publicly funded reproductive services. Specifically, it investigated variation in 
Medicaid spending between states, from 2006-2016. Overall, results supported the importance of 
functional factors, such as poverty status, but suggested that these factors were tempered 
somewhat by the race of those experiencing poverty. When spending generosity was 
operationalized by Medicaid spending per GDP, state policy appeared to be more reflective of 
the needs of White citizens. When operationalized as Medicaid spending per total social 
spending, however, the opposite was true; state policy was more reflective of the needs of Black 
citizens. This distinction importantly suggests the utility of more nuanced investigations into 
welfare state spending for healthcare in order to uncover why states that devote larger amounts 
of their spending budget to Medicaid are more responsive to Black poverty needs than states that 
devote larger amounts of their overall GDP. 
Next, Chapter 3 narrowed the scope to spending for family planning services specifically, 
namely contraception and sterilization. Like in Chapter 2, the racialized nature of levels of 
poverty and need for publicly funded contraceptives within a state is apparent. Regardless of the 
operationalization of my outcome, White women’s needs appeared to be more tightly associated 
with spending generosity than Black women’s needs. Not only was there a difference in level of 
significance, but when Black women’s needs were significantly associated with the outcome, 
they actually suggested a decrease in funding generosity. 
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Finally, in Chapter 4, I sought to investigate a particularly politically- and socially-
charged reproductive policy, public funding for abortions. Given its historical status, I was 
curious as to whether political factors, including public opinion, might play a larger role in 
shaping policy decisions than in the previous two chapters. This indeed appeared to be the case, 
as level of unionization and Democratic political representation were dominantly featured in both 
the regression and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) results. Based on regression results 
alone, poverty levels did not appear to be meaningfully associated with policy on public funding 
for abortions, countering the results from previous chapters. I also used this chapter to offer a 
comparison of different methods, regression and QCA, for evaluating variation in welfare state 
spending. Both the small number of cases within my data and my desire to apply a more 
intersectional framework to my study supported the application of QCA alongside more 
conventional regression methods. Indeed, results from the former appear much stronger than 
those of the latter, highlighting the importance of expanding the methodological tools available 
to comparative welfare state scholars. Furthermore, QCA results appear more similar to those 
from other chapters, in the extent to which they reveal racial processes at play in shaping policy 
response to need. 
Together, the findings from each chapter successfully illustrate the continued relevance 
of incorporating race and gender into the welfare state literature. In particular, they emphasize 
the extent to which current policy perhaps serves to reproduce race, gender, and class inequalities 
rather than alleviate them. Previous scholarship recognizes the state’s role in shaping and 
perpetuating our notions of race (Delgado and Stefancic 2012; Feagin 2013; HoSang, LaBennett, 
and Pulido 2012; Omi and Winant 1986) and gender (Acker 1990; Walby 1994), and future work 
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would benefit by continuing to explore the constellations of political processes at play in creating 
discriminatory public policy. 
What will the future of healthcare look like? The debate over healthcare policy, what 
should be covered, and the role of the federal government in shaping state decision-making is far 
from new (Haeder and Weimer 2015). Recent calls for “Medicare-for-all” by, among others, 
2020 Democratic presidential candidates (Uhrmacher et al. 2019) provide hope that we are 
seeing a shift in the political and public spaces that reframes healthcare as a national right rather 
than a privilege of the wealthy and/or gainfully employed. Still other politicians remain rigid in 
their insistence of the autonomous role of individuals, employees, and the marketplace in 
shaping health insurance decisions. While the current Republican-majority Congress continues 
calling for the repeal of the ACA (Davis 2019), their difficulty in doing so (Sullivan 2018), 
alongside the widening public support for universal healthcare (Kiley 2018), offers hope that 
healthcare, and particularly reproductive healthcare, as a right of citizenship may be taken more 
seriously in the near future. 
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